The Unwed Father-Unworthy? The position of the natural father in South Africa following the Constitutional Court decision in Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North by Bruk, Ilana
bH /Jt co;, 
ol/ i!J1N 
~ 
THE UNWED FATHER-UNWORTHY? 
The position of the natural father in South Africa 
following the Constitutional Court decision in 
Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North. 
By 
Ilana Bruk 
A Dissertation presented to the Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Cape Town, for the approval of part of the requirements for the 
degree of Masters of Law in approved courses and a minor dissertation. The 
other part of the requirement for this degree was the completion of a 















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 










Table of Cases 
1 8 v P 1991 ( 4) SA 113 (T) 
2 B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) 
3 Dhanabakium v Subramanian1943 (AD) 160 
4 Docrat v Bhayat 1932 TPD 125 
5 Douglas v Mayer 1987 (1) SA 910 (ZHC) 
6 F v B 1988 (3) SA 948 (D&C) 
7 F v L 1987 (4) SA 525 (W) 
8 Fraser v Naude 1997 (2) SA 82 (W) 
9 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 218 (T) 
10 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 ( CC) 
11 Mathews v Hashrawi 1937 WLD 110 
12 Quozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) 
13 Re H and another [1991] 2 ALL ER 185 
14 Re Macvicar and Superintendent Family and Child Services [1986] 34 DLR 
(4th) 
15 Regina v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 26 DLR (4TH) 200 
16 Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA 705 (E) 
17 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
18 T v M 1997 ( 1) SA 54 
19 Van Dam, Ex Parte 1973 (2) SA 182 (W) 
20 Van Erk v Homer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) 
21 W v S 1988 (1) SA 475 (N) 
22 Wicks v Fisher 1999 (2) SA 504 (N) 
23 Wilson v Eli 1914 WR 34 
Table of Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW BEFORE 1997. 
2.1 Roman Dutch Law 
2.1.1 Roman Dutch Authorities cited by the courts 
2.1.2 The Relevance of Roman Dutch Law Today 
2.2 Customary Sources 
2.2.1 Customary Law as a Source of Law 
2.2.2 Illegitimacy 
2.2.3 Parental Authority 
2.2.4 Adoption 
2.3 Statute 
2.3.1 South African Law Commission Investigation 
2.3.2 The Children's Status Act 
2.4 The Case Law 





2.4.5.1 The traditional approach 
2.4.5.2 The inherent rights approach 
2.4.5.3 The intermediate approach 
2.4.6 Adoption 
3. THE POSITION FROM 1997 TO THE PRESENT. 
3.1 The Fraser Judgements 
3.1.1 The Constitutional Court Decision 
3.1.2 Commentary on the Constitutional Judgement 





























3.2.1 The South African Law Commission Report on the Rights of a Father in respect of his 
Illegitimate Child 51 
3.2.2 The Natural Fathers Act 55 
3.2.3 The Adoption Matters Amendment Act 57 
3.3 Recent case law 61 
4. FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 63 
4.1 England 63 
4.1.2.1 The Family Law Reform Act, 1987 65 
4.1.2.2 The Children's Act 1989 66 
4.1.2.2.1 Parental Responsibility Orders 69 
4.1.2.2.2 Parental Responsibility by formal agreement 70 ! 
4.1.2.2.3 Residence, Contact and other orders 71 l l 
4.1.2.2.4 Adoption 72 
4.1.2.3 Law of the United Kingdom as a Comparative Model 73 
5. CONCLUSION 74 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 78 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"Both the interim and final constitution outlaw unfair discrimination and entrench 
equality between men and women. Equal protection before the law, privacy and 
the protection of our children. The question is thus whether the rights so 
entrenched are not being infringed by the laws that currently regulate parental 
responsibility to the children born outside of formal marriage." 1 
Few topics in South African Family law have received as much attention by the 
Courts, Legislators, academics and the general public as the legal relationship 
between fathers and their extra-marital children. The widespread national 
interest peaked recently in 1997 in the delivery of the sensationalised Fraser2 
judgement by the South African Constitutional Court. Through the declaration of 
this judgement, the Court broke new ground in pronouncing decisively not only 
on the rights of an unmarried father but also on the application of the right to 
equality within the context of a post-constitutional South Africa. 
While the dispute in this case was limited to the rights of unmarried fathers in the 
adoption proceedings of their biological children, the case highlighted the plight 
of the unmarried father as a whole. More particularly it looked at the fathers 
claims to custody, access and guardianship. The law in this regard has long 
been controversial. Despite the repeated calls for the laying down of cogent 
legal policy to cope with the growing phenomenon of the unwed father, a legal 
vacuum has been created3• The suggested reasons for the legal lacuna shall be 
considered. 
11 Chaskalson et al Commentary on South African Constitutional Law par 34.2 
2 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North & others 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) 
3 Clark B "Should the unmarried father have an inherent right of access to his child?" 
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The widespread public interest generated by the Fraser judgement4 is an 
indication of the growing number of individuals affected by legal developments 
which regulate the relationship between children born out of wedlock and their 
fathers. 
The years following World War II have been characterised by sweeping changes 
to social and economic structures. These changes have impacted greatly on the 
family unit. As the notions of class, gender and race have slowly been 
dismantled so too has the traditional rigid concept of the nuclear family. The 
modern family has moved away from the divided gender roles of the past and 
has become a more fluid entity extending to, inter alia, cohabitation and same 
sex unions. This progression has taken place both internationally and within 
South Africa. As the Canadian family lawyer, JD Payne,5 put it, 
"Although some will look back with nostalgia to the traditional nuclear family of the 1950's 
with its breadwinning husband, its homemaking wife, and their two children, that is now a 
minority group in terms of contemporary family structures in Canada. Today Canadian 
families take a wide variety of forms. They include childless marriages, two-parent 
families, single parent families in which the mother is the primary caregiver, single parent 
families where the father is the primary caregiver, Common law relationship ... Family 
structures may also vary according to ethnic and cultural factors ... Traditional notions of 
the family must clearly be re-examined in the search for rational and equitable social and 
equitable legal policies." 
As the traditional family model undergoes transformation, so too must the 
notions of the roles and positions of the individual family members. As 
Mosikatsana writes,6 
·"In the late 1990's fatherhood has become increasingly politicised as is evident from the 
debate generated by the Fraser case. The debate on fatherhood has also become 
4 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) 
5 Payne & Payne Introduction to Canadian Family Law p 2 
3 
facilitated by changes in the family, resulting from mothers' increased labour force 
participation, division of labour within the family, and the concern with the well being of 
children. The new democracy in South Africa has facilitated a context for a family policy 
debate and research agenda which addresses the issue of fatherhood in qualitatively new 
ways." 
While the instance of children born out of wedlock has grown locally and 
internationally, as a result of South Africa's peculiar sociological and legal 
legacy, illegitimacy in this country is particularly prevalent. One of the reasons for 
the high numbers is the fact that the South African Law of Marriage does not 
recognise certain traditional unions. 
Hindu, Muslim and African marriages as potentially polygamous marriages have 
traditionally been denied the legal status of a valid marriage. 7 The progeny of 
such unions has therefore been declared illegitimate. The impact thereof is that a 
great number of children born to these unions are affected by regulations 
regarding illegitimacy. A new act, The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
1998 has been passed. This act aims to award recognition to African Customary 
Marriages. However at the time of writing it was yet to come in to operation and 
deals only with African customary marriages. The Act does not deal with the 
important issue of the status of Islamic and Hindu marriages. While it is 
suspected that the Constitutional Court will soon rule decisively on the status of 
these unions, neither the courts nor Parliament have seized the opportunity to 
intervene in this matter.8 
The high rate of illegitimacy can also be ascribed to the abortion laws which were 
in place before The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act9 came into effect in 
1997. The conditions under which · abortions were allowed were particularly 
6 Mosikatsana "Is Papa a Rolling Stone ? The Unwed father and his Child in South African Law- a 
Comment on Fraser v Naude" CILSA 1996 pl58 
7 Dhanabakium v Subramanian 1943 (AD) 160 
8 N Goolam "The Law oflslam" Schafer's Family Law Service 24th Service. 
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stringent and as a result abortion was not an option available to the majority of 
women. Many children were born out of wedlock to reluctant mothers. 10 The 
prevalence of extra-marital births has been linked to an exhaustive list of socio-
economic factors which include migrant labour, poverty and the position of 
women in society inter a/ia. 11 Unfortunately these causes cannot be considered 
further here. 
Despite the frequent calls for cogent legal policy on the question of the natural 
father, it was only in 1997 that the constitutional court was called upon to make a 
judicial pronouncement in the Fraser decision. 12 As a consequence, a new act 
entitled The Natural Fathers of Children Born Out of Wedlock Act of 1997 
[hereafter referred to as The Natural Fathers Act], was promulgated shortly 
afterwards. In order that these developments are properly assessed, it is 
important to consider the broader context in which they occurred. This 
necessitates a thorough investigation of the long line of judicial precedent, 
Common Law sources, the statutory law and relevant portions of the 
Constitution. 
Furthermore the developments themselves require examination. The South 
African experience is not unique and in order to assess the worthiness of the 
new legal policy it is necessary to compare our experience with those of other 
jurisdictions which are themselves forging new policies regulating the position of 
unmarried fathers. Due to restrictions in content I have restricted the 
comparative study to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom (England and 
Scotland). 
9 Act 92 of 1996 
10 S Burman in the editorial Chapter, Burman S & Preston Whyte Questionable Issue? Illegitimacy in 
South Africa 1992 
II ibid 
12 Fraser v Childrens Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA (CC) 
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The United Kingdom model is relevant as it has developed a long line of cases 
which forms an important legal source. Our courts have often borrowed from the 
English law which is used as a persuasive legal source in our jurisdiction 
particularly in instances when the South African sources have been exhausted. 
The position of the natural father cannot be said to be sufficiently governed by 
Roman Dutch Law, 13 as the case law is confusing, as will be shown below,14 and 
the statute so new that it is yet to be applied. It would therefore appear that here 
reference to United Kingdom Law is particularly appropriate. It is also interesting 
to note the influence that the English statute, The Children's Act 1989 has had 
on The Natural Fathers Act 1997,if any. 
13 B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) 
14 Please see Chapter 2.4 infra. 
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2. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW BEFORE 1997. 
"The father has no rights in respect of the children. He has no parental power and is not 
the legal guardian."15 
Clark and Van Heerden, writing in 1992, summarised the Common Law position 
of the unmarried father in the above extract. The various sources comprising the 
Common Law will be examined to indicate the background which gives rise to 
such a summation. 
2.1 Roman Dutch Law 
Unfortunately Roman Dutch Law, the traditional source of South African 
Common Law does not achieve clarity on the issue. Many Roman Dutch writers 
either did not address the concept of unwed fathers directly or disregarded the 
role of the father to the point that the child was considered fatherless. 16 
2.1.1 Roman Dutch Authorities cited by the courts 
The Roman Dutch principle of "een moeder maakt geen bastard" (a mother does 
not a bastard make) has been quoted in support of the view that an unmarried 
father was not considered to be a parent to his extra- marital child. In the 1987 
case of F v L, 17 Judge Harms referred to the Roman Dutch writer, Van Leeuwen 
and stated at p 526 of the judgement, 
" According to Van Leeuwen ... so called "speelkinderen" are considered as if they have 
no father. In a footnote he adds that except for children of noblemen illegitimate children 
are quoad their father considered as strangers." 
15 Clark and Van Heerden "The legal Position of Children Born out of wedlock" in S Burman 
Questionable Issue? Illegitimacy in South Africa 1992 
16 Boberg The Law of Persons and the Family 1977 p 355 
17 FvL 1987{4) SA 525 (W) 
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In the 1995 Appellate Division judgement 8 v S, 18 it was argued on behalf of the 
unmarried father that the Roman Dutch Law, unlike Roman Law, recognised the 
unmarried father by placing him under a duty to support his illegitimate child and 
by requiring his consent for his child's marriage. However Judge Howie, in his 
majority decision, stated that not withstanding the limited legal recognition that 
the natural father may enjoy, that this recognition could not bestow upon the 
father any parental authority over his child. He could not then of right lay Claim to 
the consequences of such authority, which in that case was the right of access. 
The Court states at 575 D ff. 
"Access like custody is an incident of parental authority ... Consequently if access is the 
fathers entitlement as a matter of inherent legal right, it can only stem from his parental 
authority. The duty of support and marriage impediment in no measure imply the 
existence of any parental authority from which the supposed right of access could have 
been derived." 
The Court went on to consider the Roman Dutch writers and stated at page 525 
paragraphs G to I, 
"The fact is that in Roman Dutch Law an illegitimate child fell under the parental authority 
and thus the guardianship and custody of its mother, the father had no such authority." 
2.1.2 The Relevance of Roman Dutch Law Today 
Despite the relative paucity of authority found in Roman Dutch Law, the old 
Common Law is a useful starting point for discussion. It has provided the 
terminology still applicable today such as "illegitimacy" and "parental authority". 
In fact, the definition of legitimacy relied upon by the Courts19 and by respected 
writers such as Spiro, is founded in the works of the Roman Dutch writers; Voet, 
Grotius, Van Leeuwen and others. 
18 Bv Sop cit 
19 F v Lop cit 
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Spiro, in Law of Parent and Child,20 sets out the various circumstances of birth 
which would render a child legitimate and on that basis forms a definition of 
illegitimacy. Children who are either conceived or born during the subsistence of 
the marriage of the child's parents are all presumed legitimate on the basis of the 
Common Law presumption, pater est quern nuptiae demonstrant. Those children 
born out of wedlock whose parents later marry are legitimated by the subsequent 
marriage.21 
Roman Dutch Law is of relevance to the modern dilemma of the natural father for 
a further reason; while we have entered an age of constitutional supremacy, the 
Constitution has not completely replaced the Common Law. The courts are 
obligated in terms of Section 35 of the Constitution, also termed the 
interpretation clause, to develop the Common .Law so that it is consistent with 
constitutional values. As Judge Pillay stated in the recent Wicks v Fisher22case at 
p511, 
"I am mindful of the modern trend in custody and access issues relating to illegitimate 
children, according rights to the father of an illegitimate child not recognised at common 
law. However I am enforced in terms of our constitution to develop the common law to 
promote the objects of the bill of rights." 
Although the Roman Dutch Law has provided some useful authority, it leaves 
many questions unanswered. This is because not only have dramatic social 
changes occurred since the recording of the Common Law but recent 
developments in medical science have rendered a portion of those writings 
obsolete. The focus of much of the Roman Dutch Law was on the factual 
question of paternity. While various legal theories and presumptions were 
formulated to determine the question of fatherhood, today DNA fingerprinting can 
affirm with over 99% accuracy the identity of the father. 23 
20 Spiro Law of Parent and Child 1985 p 20 
21 ibid 
22 Wicks v Fisher 1999(2) SA 504(NPD) 
23 Clark and Van Heerden op cit p38 
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Despite the debates surrounding the Roman Dutch Law, it is clear is that these 
principles were heavily relied upon in the drafting of the only statute on point in 
pre - 1997 South Africa, The Children's Status Act 82 Of 1987. 
2.2 Customary Sources 
2.2.1 Customary Law as a Source of Law 
African Customary Law is an important but complex source of Law in a post -
Constitutional South Africa. The tenor of the Bill of Rights is that of one which 
recognises the pluralistic nature of the South African society and the right to self 
-determination is guaranteed in Section 235.24 It has therefore been argued that 
certain groups have a right to be governed by Customary Law.25 
Bennet considered the interim constitution in order to assess the current status 
of African Customary Law and stated,26 
"Section 31 of the Constitution provides the rudiments of a new approach to Customary 
Law. It states that, "Every person shall have the right to use the language and to 
participate in the cultural life of his or her choice." On the basis of this section 
supplemented with the authority of international and comparative foreign law, an 
argument can be made that the state is now obliged to recognise and apply customary 
law in its courts."27 
24 Section 235 states, "The Right of South African people as a whole to self-determination , as manifested 
in this Constitution does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the 
right of self- determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a 
territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way determined by national legislation." 
25 Bennet Human Rights and African Customary Law 
26 Bennet op cit 23 
27 Although section 31 has been replaced by section 30 of the new Constitution , the wording has remained 
the same 
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The Constitution promotes the right to culture in Family Law matters further in 
Section 15(2) ii which is entitled 'Freedom of religion, belief and opinion', by 
providing, 
" This section does not prevent legislation recognising .... 
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons 
professing a particular religion." 
While it has been commented that this provision was inserted to provide for the 
recognition of African customary marriages,28 it does also serve to reinforce the 
relevance of African Customary Law to the legal system as a whole. 
However, the right to customary law is controversial. The right to culture does not 
exist in a vacuum and as such must be seen within the context of the Bill of 
Rights. African Customary Law has been labelled patriarchal and sexist by many 
authors. As Sinclair writes,29 
" Although it is true that our civil law is also based on patriarchy, women have made 
substantial gains in achieving formal equality within that system. This is not true of African 
Customary Law, which remains fundamentally premised on patriarchal notions that are 
largely unchallenged and highly controversial." 
Hence it is clear that African Customary Law maybe interpreted by some to 
offend against the right of women not to be unfairly discriminated against in 
terms of the right to equality. Ultimately this seeming contradiction will have to 
boil down to a balancing of rights. It must be borne in mind that the limitation 
clause, Section 36, provides for the limitation of certain rights. It is submitted that 
as there is a right to culture and tradition, the legislature and judiciary are 
enjoined to apply such systems of law where appropriate. However, the 
28 Currie,"Indigenous Law" Chapter 36 Chaskalson et al op cit 
29 Sinclair "Family Rights" in Van Wyk, Dugard ,De Villiers and Davis Rights and Constitutionalism p 561 
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application of these rights is limited to circumstances in which the competing 
right to equality is not compromised. The right to equality will receive further 
discussion below. 
Another problem, which is encountered in the application of African Customary 
Law, is far more practical. There is no homogenous system of African Customary 
Law. In this country separate indigenous heritages, traditions and systems of 
rules exist. Notwithstanding this diversity, certain principles of African Customary 
Law have been extracted and presented as reflective of African tradition. 
2.2.2 Illegitimacy 
Illegitimacy in the African setting takes place on two levels; firstly there are those 
children who are deemed illegitimate by virtue of Customary Law and secondly 
there are those children who are legitimate in terms of African Custom but are 
illegitimate in Civil Law. This is due to the fact that, as mentioned above, many 
African unions are still not recognised as valid unions in the eyes of South 
African Law. 
Unlike Civil Law, the status of illegitimacy in African custom is not dependant on 
the marital status of the parents but rather on the payment of lobolo 
(bridewealth). Bennet summarises the law concisely by stating,30 
" The relationship between a mother and child is socially close and obvious; the same is 
not necessarily true of the relationship between a father and child. Payment of bridewealth 
fixes and proclaims the link between men and children. Hence the customary-rule is that if 
bridewealth has been paid, the child will be attached to its father's family; otherwise it is 
part of the mother's family " 
It is then clear that there might be situations where the two legal systems conflict. 
For example a couple may enter a valid marriage in terms of South African Law, 
however, the father may not have made the requisite lobolo payments in which 
12 
case the Court might be at a loss as to whether to define the child as extra-
marital or not. It is submitted that in such instances, the Court should apply the 
system that would most benefit the child. In the current example, it would be in 
the child's best interests to be deemed legitimate and as such the civil legal 
system should be applied. 
In a similar vein to the civil system, African custom provides that the offspring of 
a married woman are deemed the legitimate children of her husband. 31 
2.2.3 Parental Authority 
In terms of African Customary Law, as applied by our courts, the natural father 
has no inherent rights to the child and acquires these rights through the marriage 
to the child's mother and through the payment of lobolo. 32 
Bennet wrote that in most traditional systems a father could acquire parental 
rights through payments to the child's guardian. Either the payment of seduction 
damages, which functioned as compensation for disgracing the mother and her 
family would suffice or in some traditions, such as the Nguni custom, an 
additional payment in order to confirm the father's paternal rights was required. 
The additional payment was regarded as compensation to the mother and her 
family for the burden of raising the child.33 
This system has come under criticism from legal commentators and judges as it 
has been argued that the acquiring of rights to the child through the payment of 
money is tantamount to the purchase and sale of a child. Courts have also been 
reluctant to apply this system as it could conflict with the Court's primary 
responsibility to uphold the best interests of the child.34 
30 Bennet Sourcebook on African Customary Law for Southern African p 358 
31 Clark and Van Heerden op cit p 43 
32 Bennet op cit p 358 
33 Bennet African Customary Law p 373 
34 Clark and Van Heerden op cit p45 
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2.2.4 Adoption 
The Child Care Act in section 27, which section was subsequently repealed, 
afforded limited recognition to African Customary Unions. The act provided that a 
"customary union" as defined in the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 was 
deemed a marriage for the purposes of chapter four of the Child Care Act. 
Chapter four regulated adoption procedures and as such those fathers who 
qualified in terms of the Black Administration Act were required to offer their 
consent to the adoption of their children born within a customary union. 
2.3 Statute 
While the Common Law did not have sufficient cogent legal policy to cope with 
the growing incidence of illegitimacy, the only act which dealt specifically with 
extra - marital children in the years preceding 1997, The Children's Status Act,35 
did little to ameliorate the position. 
This act was passed, as the name suggests, to eliminate the differences in legal 
status between illegitimate and legitimate children. The act aimed to remove the 
stigma associated with illegitimacy. However, it did not address in any 
meaningful way the difference in the relationships between legitimate children 
and their fathers and illegitimate children and their fathers. 
It is important to note that contact with both parents is a child's right enshrined in 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.36This Convention was passed in 
1989 a mere two years after the passing of the Children's Status Act2I. However 
South Africa only ratified the Convention in 1995. 
35 Act No 82 of 1987 
36 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
37 Act No 82 Of 1987 
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2.3.1 South African Law Commission Investigation 
In 1984 the South African Law Commission (hereafter the SALC) compiled a 
report upon which the Act is based. After the Law Commission briefly considered 
the case law and the question of an unmarried fathers claim to parental power, 
the SALC recommended as follows at paragraph 8.27.38 
"It is clear from the outset that parental power cannot be granted ex lege to all fathers of 
illegitimate children." 
At 8.19 the SALC recommends: 
"Legal policy ought to be one of minimum interference - therefore the law should leave a 
father to do as he pleases regarding access and only clamp down on him when he 
abuses it. ... Since legal development is tending in the right direction, it is undesirable for 
the legislature to interfere at this stage." 
This suggestion is unhelpful as firstly the Law Commission does not at any stage 
define the term "right direction". We are not told what that "direction" is and why 
it is that that direction is the "right" one. However, what is of even more concern 
is that the Commissioners clearly follow a "non-interventionist" approach to 
Family Law. This approach posits that the nature of family life is private and 
should not be regulated by Government. This school of thought avers that as no 
two family situations that the family members should not be regulated by 
universally applicable laws.39 
While the standpoint is not without merit, it is submitted that the question of an 
unwed father's right to access is an important one and has involved the 
balancing of the best interests of the child against parental rights to have contact 
with their children. This is a debate fraught with complexities and is a dispute so 
commonly encountered today that it cannot be left to the father to "do as he 
pleases". The various parties affected i.e. the mother, father and child are 
38 SALC "Report on the Investigation into the legal position of illegitimate Children" Project 38/1985 
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entitled to greater certainty as to their rights and responsibilities than the 
approach put forward by the SALC. As Bonthuys wrote recently, 40 
" One of the most important advances in the law relating to children has been the 
realisation that society has the right to pierce the veil of privacy surrounding the home and 
to prescribe behaviour in this sphere hitherto regarded in the light of a man's home being 
his castle. Examples are the increased legal concern with matters such as domestic 
violence, marital rape, child abuse and lately also the abuse of the elderly." 
It would then appear that the SALC has not kept up with the reforms in Family 
Law. The non-interventionist school of family law has been associated with the 
positivist ideologies of the 19th and early 20th Centuries41 and has been criticised 
for not laying down functional social and legal policies. Today certain social 
values required in society have been recognised. Regulation, which imports 
these values into society by intervening into the private sphere, has been 
promoted. Bonthuys writes, 42 
"The change is premised on the idea that family and genetic ties cannot be used to justify 
all forms of behaviour and society has to set social standards for behaviour." 
As the determination as to whether the father has such a right to access has 
such far-reaching results, it is submitted that regulation is vital in this regard. The 
line of precedent is so confused and the waters so muddy, judges such as Howie 
in the B v S43 judgement have been forced to request legislative intervention: 
. '!If there are sound sociological and policy reasons for affording such fathers an inherent 
access right in addition to the right they already have to be granted access where it is in 
the best interests of their children, then that is a matter that can only be dealt with 
legislatively". 
39 C Smart" Regulating families or legitimating patriarchy? Family Law in Britain" 1982 Family Law p 
152 
40 Bonthuys "of Biological Bonds, new fathers and the best interest of the children" SAJHR 1998 p 636 
41 C Smart op cit p159 
42 Bonthuys op cit p 638 
43 B v S op cit at p 579 par I 
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2.3.2 The Children's Status Act 
The wording of the act is almost identical to that of the SALC's 
recommendations. Considering the contents of the report it is then not surprising 
that the important questions regarding the unwed father's rights to custody, 
guardianship and access were not taken any further. Notwithstanding the 
obvious omissions, the act does lend clarity to certain issues. The preamble 
reads, "To amend the law relating to paternity, guardianship and the status of 
certain children". Although the preamble mentions "certain children", the 
reference is clearly to the extra marital child. 
The first purpose of the act was the regulation of the law pertaining to paternity. 
Many cases involving unwed fathers before 1997 were fought on two legs. If it 
was the case that either of the parents disputed the question of paternity then 
the first stage in proceedings would be the resolution of that dispute. Only once 
paternity was established could the fathers' rights or duties be argued before the 
Court.44 The Common Law had developed certain presumptions to assist in such 
a dispute. 
While the act followed these presumptions, they were modified to be more 
workable in a modern age. For example, in terms of Roman Dutch Law, it need 
only be proven that a man had had intercourse with a woman at any time for a 
presumption of paternity to apply. This cast the net of paternity very widely. 
However the drafters followed the case of F v L 45 and created a more reasonable 
standard. The act states that it is first to be proven that the couple had had 
intercourse at a time when conception could have occurred, "the critical time" for 
the presumption to operate.46 
44 F v Lop cit 
45 F v Lop cit 
46 Spiro Annotations to Recent Extra-Marital Legislation 1988 p 2 
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As mentioned above47 , a DNA test can today positively identify a father whereas 
to the old blood tests, which operated negatively, could only conclusively 
disprove a paternity claim. This development, which has occurred within the 
decade has had a dramatic effect on the Law regarding the Natural Father. 
Lupton writes48, 
" The genetic information each of us carries in our cells is inherited from our parents and 
thus the tests can be used to establish family relationships. Disputes over paternity can 
now for the first time be positively resolved beyond reasonable doubt." 
In the past a father disputing a claim of paternity could conclusively prove that he 
was not the father. Therefore a man escaping a potential maintenance claim 
could rely on the blood tests, whereas a father wishing to assert paternity was in 
a weaker position and could not be assisted by medical science in the 
eradication of all doubt as to his fatherhood. The factual uncertainty could lead to 
a tenuous relationship between a natural father and his child. The recent legal 
reforms in this area must then be seen in the context of medical development. 
Although not all the legal presumptions of paternity are relevant today, the 
second section contained in the act is a particularly useful legislative provision . 
• 
The statute lays down that if paternity is in dispute, a refusal to consent to blood 
tests by a party to the dispute is presumed to be aimed at the concealing of the 
truth.49 The provision establishes certainty as it has the effect of compelling the 
parties to submit to blood tests. Both the child's best interests and the father's 
rights are served by such a provision which is designed at achieving truth and 
certainty. 
A further progression made in the act was one of terminology. Before the advent 
of the act the term "bastard" was often used to describe extra-marital children. 
47 Please see Par 2.1.2 supra 
48 Lupton "Medico-legal Aspects" Issue 23 Schafer's Family Law Service p 33 
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The act replaced this word with the term "extra-marital. This is not simply a 
question of semantics. A change of this nature reflects a policy change, which 
runs to the very core of the debate surrounding natural fathers. It has been 
posited in the past that the illegitimate child suffers in law as a result of the sins 
of the fathers.50 
The term "bastard" arises out of the conservative approach which condemned 
procreation outside of marriage and which stigmatised the offspring of such 
"sinners". Through the restructuring of the discourse surrounding the debate, the 
legislators create a climate of tolerance towards extra-marital relationships and 
smooth the way for normal relationships between natural fathers and their 
children. 
The act includes a section headed," Guardianship and Custody of Extra-marital 
Children." This title is misleading as the legislature purports to regulate this 
vexed area of law while in fact it does not. Only one remote situation is catered 
for in this section, the position of an unmarried mother who has not yet attained 
the age of majority. The act provides that in such circumstances the custody of 
the child will vest in the minor mother while the guardianship vests in the 
guardian of the mother. 51 
It can only then be assumed that the issues pertaining to the custody and 
guardianship of extra-marital children were not omitted from the act as a result of 
an oversight on the part of the drafters. The legislators were presumably of the 
opinion that it was trite law that these powers vested in the mother and as such 
did not necessitate regulation. Further, on an interpretation of the statute it can 
be deduced that if a minor mother has custody that a fortiori an adult mother is 
vested with such a right. 
49 ibid 
50 Boberg" The sins of the fathers and the law's retribution" Businessman's law 1988 p35 
51 Section 3 Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 
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It is submitted however that the legislators should have attempted to address the 
question of the father's claims to parental authority and the validity thereof. This 
is particularly important in cases where the child does not have a mother with 
parental authority, either as a result of the mother's demise or through a lack of 
competence on her part. The Court's decisions regarding a father's claim in 
these instances have varied dramatically. It has therefore been difficult to 
ascertain whether the natural father enjoys a special relationship by virtue of his 
biological ties or whether he is, in the words of the Court, a "stranger to the 
child."52 
It is unfortunate that the legislators did not see fit to lend clarity to the father's 
position vis-a-vis his child, particularly in the aforesaid circumstances as the 
reluctance of Parliament to intervene would plunge South African Law into a 
decade of legal uncertainty. 
2.4 The Case Law 
"In 1948 in Fletcher v Fletcher the Appellate Division confirmed that the most important 
factor to be considered in issues like custody and access is not the rights of parents but 
the best interests of the children."53 
2.4.1 The Best Interests of the Child 
The Courts have relied throughout on the test of the "best interests of the child" 
as the yardstick of determination in matters involving children. Although the line 
of case law is confused and contradictory, the significance of this principle has 
never been disputed and has achieved almost a sacredness among judges.54 
52 Docrat v Bhayat 1932 TPD 125 
53 Bonthuys op cit p 623 
54 B VS 
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The best interests test has been universally recognised and incorporated into the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 which provides at Article 3(1 ), 
"In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authoritative or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." 
The South African Constitution would later include in the Bill of Rights the 
stipulation that the child's best interests are of paramount importance in 
proceedings involving children.55 Hence in applying this test, the judiciary not 
only fulfils its obligations in terms of its mandate as the Upper Guardian of all 
minors56 but it also acts in accordance with international treaties to which South 
Africa is a signatory. 
The application of the best interests test to cases involving natural fathers was 
summarised in the most recent case involving the natural father's claim to access 
as follows, 
"While at common law the father of an illegitimate child, unlike the father of a legitimate 
child has no right of access, the difference between the respective positions of the two 
fathers is not one of real substance in practice since in our modern law whether or not 
access to a minor child is granted to its non-custodian father is dependant not upon the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child but in each case wholly upon the child's welfare 
which is the central and constant consideration."57 
While it may appear that this test is the key to the solution of disputes over 
parental authority in an objective and fair manner, this appearance is deceptive. 
The test is by its very nature value-laden, subjective and often collapsible. It is 
collapsible in that the decision as to the best interests of the child is often 
55 Section 28 Constitution of South Africa 1996 
56 Rowan v Faifer 1953 2 SA 705 (ED) 
57 T v M 1997 (1) SA 54 ATP 57 par H- I 
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decided on the stronger parental claim rather than the child's interests, as it is 
seen as a natural consequence that the child's interests would be best served if 
the child is in the custody or under the guardianship of the more suitable parent. 
As will be shown from the long and involved case law, the position of the natural 
father is defined through the father's struggle to have his parental rights 
recognised and his efforts to prove that the contact he has vyith his child does not 
conflict with the child's best interests. 
The facts of each case are significant in the determination of the child's best 
interests. The courts have purported to scrutinise the individual facts in their 
decisions. It is submitted that the facts have not been sufficiently examined by 
the courts in the past and as a result the best interest test has been applied 
superficially and only lip service has been paid to it. 58The approach adopted in B 
v P59 is to be applauded. In that case the Court clearly placed great emphasis on 
the facts of the matter. Judge Kirk -Cohen called for further evidence and expert 
reports as he did not consider himself to be in a position to properly adjudicate 
the matter without further facts being placed at his disposal. 
Boberg has criticised the manner in which the courts have applied the facts of 
individual cases. He stated that while the courts look at the bonding that has 
taken place between the father and his child, particularly in applications for 
access, the courts do not look further to the facts behind the reasons why the 
child has not bonded with the father. Boberg cautions that there are instances 
where the single mother has wrongfully restricted the access of the father 
through reasons of malice and prevented the child from bonding with the father. 
In these instances then the father would be prevented from enjoying future 
access on the basis that bonding had not taken place. Boberg writes,60 
59 B v P 1991(4) SAl 13 
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"If a parent can withhold a child from the other parent until the child gets over the loss 
... the parent can then argue successfully that it would be detrimental to the child to 
attempt to re-establish the bond with that parent. The argument would be unaffected by 
such considerations as whether the parent had acted lawfully in depriving the child of the 
other parent in the first place, or whether the parent unreasonably refused to facilitate the 
re-establishment of the bond." 
It is also important for the courts to isolate the particular expression of parental 
authority in dispute so that the factors considered by the court and standard of 
proof required are adjusted accordingly. Authors Ohannesian and Steyn criticise 
· the judgement of Douglas v Mayer.61 The authors ascribe the court's refusal in 
that judgement to grant access to the father to the fact that the court applied a 
higher standard of proof more appropriate to a custody application. They write 
that custody, "involves total physical control over the child while access 
represents but a small encroachment on this physical control."62 Van Zyl J, in 
Van Erk v Holmer,63 quoted this passage with approval and expressed his 
disapproval of the earlier judgement on that basis. 
2.4.2 Custody 
Custody over a child represents parental control. It comprises the right and duty 
to care for a child, to make decisions regarding the child's religion and to have 
the child live with the custodial parent. The courts have in cases of both 
legitimate and illegitimate children favoured the mother as custodial parent64 • 
This rule has been termed," the maternal preference rule". While this rule is 
regularly applied in cases involving legitimate children, it is almost slavishly 
followed in instances of illegitimate children, as displayed in the aforementioned 
cases of Douglas v Mayers,65 Docrat v Bhayat66 inter alia. 
60 Boberg "The Sins of the Father op cit p 38 
61 Ohannesian & Steyn "To see or not to see ?-That is the Question THRHR 1991 p 257 
62 ibid 
63 Van Erk v Holmer op cit 
64 Boberg Law of Parent and Family p 335 
65 Douglas v Mayer op cit 
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The maternal preference rule was recently described as follows in a divorce 
judgement, Ex Parte Crichtfield,67 
''The contest between a mother and a father for custody of minor children of tender years 
is rather like the race between the tortoise and the hare, immortalised in Aesop's fables; 
the unalterable physical fact that it is mothers and mothers alone who must bear the 
burden of pregnancy has as its consequence by reason of the bonding that this entails 
and the development of personality even within the womb the giving of a headstart to 
mothers in any claims upon their relationship with their children and this surely occurs in 
the ordinary experience of humankind and has been monitored by psychologists." 
Yet the Court did later add that just as the tortoise through sheer endurance 
managed to beat the hare, there are circumstances in which the father proves 
himself to be more suitable to meet the best interests of the children. The Court 
as the Upper Guardian of all minors may deprive a mother of her right to custody 
in appropriate circumstances. However, the courts have held that a natural father 
is not to be treated differently from any other third parties in a custody dispute. 
In earlier cases such as that of Docrat v Bhayat,68 the father was not granted 
locus standi to apply for custody of his child. In that instance, the parents had 
been married according to Muslim rites and the mother subsequently passed 
away. However, these facts were not sufficient to convince the Court that the 
father had an interest in the custody of the children. In the later case of Rowan v 
Faifer,69 however, the Court stated, 
" On these cases it seems that though the father of his bastard child has no rights to its 
custody, he has locus standi to appear. He serves a useful purpose. Through him the 
66 Docrat v Bhayat op cit 
67 Ex Parte Crichtfield 1999 (3) SA132 at 138 par E 
68 Docrat v Bhayat op cit 
69 Rowan v Faifer 1953 (2) SA705 (ED) at p 710 
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merits of the case are investigated, and if the interests of the child lie that way he may be 
awarded its custody." 
Hence while a natural father may stand a chance of gaining custody in these 
proceedings, by virtue of his marital status and gender, his chances are slim. It 
has been held to be reasonable that the question of legitimacy is a factor to be 
considered in the weighing up by the Court of all the relevant factors in order to 
determine the best interests of the child in custody applications. 
Boberg, who often criticised the courts for not properly embracing the rights of 
fathers, states, 10 
"It is understandable that, where custody and guardianship are in issue regard should be 
had to the legitimacy of the parents' relationship." 
The fact that the father has not married the mother could be an indicator of the 
man's level of commitment to the family unit and the child. However this is not 
always the case and courts should be cautious not to paint all fathers with the 
same brush. In particular those fathers who are committed to customary unions 
should be distinguished from those natural fathers who might not participate in 
the family life of the child. It is respectfully submitted that the courts have erred in 
the past in not making such a distinction.71 
Despite the fact that in the case law, married or not, fathers have consistently 
been denied the same rights to custody as mothers, this branch of parental 
authority has not been as controversial as the right to access. As, in general, 
mothers in this country remain the primary caregiver, it stands to reason that the 
fight over custody is not usually the father's main area of concern. 
70 Boberg," The sins of the fathers and the law's retribution" op cit p 38 
71 Docrat v Bhayat op cit, Dhanabakiurn v Subramanian op cit. 
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Authors at home and abroad have highlighted the effect that this approach has 
had, not only on Family Law principles, but on the role of women in society as a 
whole.72 Ironically the award of parental power has been held to disempower 
women. It is opined that the Courts have granted the mother custody 
automatically on the basis of her gender73 and by so doing have confined women 
to that role. The courts reinforce the perception that these gender roles are 
carved in stone and that they are only to be departed from in the most rare of 
occasions. Therefore writers such as Sinclair have called for a more uniform 
approach to the gender roles in disputes involving parental authority. 74There are 
however other feminist writers who view the call for identical treatment of men 
and women to be contrary to women's' interests as will be more fully discussed 
below.75 
2.4.3 Guardianship 
Guardianship involves the decision making power that a parent has over the 
child's person and property.76 Before the case law in this regard is considered it 
is important to consider the Guardianship Act.77 The act was passed to amend 
the Common Law which granted guardianship rights only to the father, to the 
exclusion of the mother, upon divorce. The Common Law reflected out of the 
conservative perception that major responsibilities involving the child would be 
best discharged by the 'man of the house'. The act provides for the power to be 
held jointly by both parents. This act does not provide for the illegitimate child 
and once again Parliament neglected to provide clarity on that issue. 
72 B Hogget op cit, Mosikatsana op cit 
73 J Sinclair 'Family Rights" Rights and Constitutionalism' 
74 ibid 
75 Kindly see Chapter 3.1.2 infra 
76 Bronstein in Chaskalson et al op cit par 34.2 
77 192/1993 
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In Ex Parte Van Dam, 78 the difference in the position of married and unmarried 
fathers was evident. In that case a couple had married, bore a child and then 
divorced. They later reconciled and had more children. As the case took place 
before the advent of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993, the Court found that the 
applicant, as father, had the right to custody over the child born of the marriage. 
As regards the remaining children, however, the Court conducted a thorough 
investigation into whether it would be in the children's best interests for the father 
to be vested with guardianship. The Court in so doing followed the approach 
adopted in Rowan v Faifer79 and found that in appropriate circumstances the 
unwed father could be vested with rights of guardianship. 
In Ex Parte Van Dam80 the Court concluded that it would be appropriate in the 
circumstances to award guardianship of all the children to the father. It is 
submitted that the approach adopted in this case was sound. This case is to be 
emulated as the Court, in judging the illegitimate children's best interests, clearly 
considered the degree of commitment that the father displayed towards the 
children and the fact that he was already the guardian of the legitimate child. 
2.4.4 Maintenance 
It was conclusively established in the decision of Lamb v Sackl!.1 (which case has 
been consistently approved in subsequent cases}82 that an unmarried father has 
the same duty to support his child as a married father. Both parents are obligated 
to support their child pro rata according to their economic ability.83 The natural 
father's duty is said to arise out of the blood relationship between the father and 
child and not through any parental authority on the father's part.84 Hence the 
78 Ex Parte Van Dam 1973 2 SA182 (W) 
79 Rowan v Faifer 
80 Ex Parte Van Dam op cit 
81 Lamb v Sack 1974 (2) SA 67 (T) 
82 F v L op cit, B v S op cit, 
83 Lamb v Sack op cit 
84 Clark & Van Heerden op cit p 41 
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claim to parental power based on maintenance obligations has been rejected in 
the past.85 
2.4.5 Access 
By far the most disputed paternal right has been that of access. This is hardly 
surprising as access is traditionally the "father's right", a right inherent to the 
married father and which right he usually confirms on divorce.86 While the 
Common Law has made it clear that an unwed father does not have a prima 
facie right to custody and guardianship, virtual legal chaos has reigned in respect 
of the natural father's right of access. Boberg writes about this right, 87 
"But access is not the subject of a contest. It is the booby prize awarded to the loser in the 
competition for greater rights. It is little enough to give him. Properly exercised it is 
essential to the child's normal emotional development. And it should not be withheld 
merely because the parents were not married. " 
In earlier cases there was an indication that an automatic right of access vested 
in the unwed father. In Wilson v Eli88 the Court appeared to hold that the father 
was entitled to access on the basis of his maintenance obligation to the child. 
This approach has been consistently condemned. In F v L,89 the Court held that it 
was inappropriate to consider a right of access as a quid pro quo to the duty to 
maintain. This seems to be the standpoint of most judges and is the correct one 
based on the best interest test. 90 It is surely always in the child's best interests 
to be properly maintained but is not always in the child's best interests to have 
contact with his or her father. 
85 B v P op cit , F v L op cit 
86 Hahlo And Kahn The South African Law of Marriage 
87 Boberg op cit p 38 
88 Wilson v Eli 1914 WR 34 
89 op cit p 527 
90 B v Sop cit, Van Erk v Holmer 
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The cry of the natural father often heard in the media is that it is not right that he 
pays maintenance but does not get to see his child.91 While one can certainly 
see why the father would find this situation frustrating, it seems somewhat 
immoral to equate the father's payment of maintenance with his right of access. 
The child becomes a commodity whose contact is bought. This is not to say that 
the maintenance of the child by the natural father is not relevant. In the 
assessment of the child's best interests, a court will have regard to the question 
as to whether the father makes maintenance contributions as evidence of his 
commitment to the child. 92 
In the Mathews v Hashrawi93 judgement, access was awarded to the natural 
father as of right. However as there was no judicial reasoning behind the 
decision, the judgement was not considered binding in later cases94 • 
In general the cases have followed one of three approaches: 
2.4.5.1 The traditional approach 
The one stance which has been adopted by the courts, applies a stringent 
standard whereby the father is required to satisfy the Court that he should be 
entitled to "encroach upon" and "diminish" the custodial rights of the mother. In 
Douglas v Mayer, it was stated,95 
" The onus is on the applicant, in this case the father to satisfy the Court on the matter 
and usually the Court will not intervene unless there is some very strong ground 
compelling it to do so. The standard usually applied by the Court is that used before 
interfering with the custodial rights of a father of a legitimate child." 
91 Van Onselen "TUFF-the unmarried fathers fight"l991 
92 In Douglas v Mayers.op cit the Court stated at p 914 F "The fact that the applicant is paying 
maintenance for the child will also in my view be taken into account." 
93 Mathews v Hashrawi 1937 WLD 110 
94 B v S op cit at p576 B 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in this case in a number of ways. 
Firstly the understanding of access as an encroachment of the mother's 
custodial right is respectfully, incorrect. The right of access should not detract 
from the right of custody, the two rights co-exist to enable the child to have 
contact with both parents. Secondly, The Court adopted an extremely non-
interventionist approach to Family Law, the drawbacks of which have been 
discussed above.96 Thirdly, the Court required a 'compelling ground' to intervene. 
This placed an onerous burden on the father, which he was almost certain not to 
discharge. Fourthly, it failed to differentiate between the process involved in 
deciding access and that of deciding custody, which, as stated above,97 is clearly 
problematic. 
Douglas v Mayer 98was later followed in the subsequent case of F V 8.99 If the 
stringent standard espoused in these cases is applied, the father is almost 
certain to be unsuccessful in an access claim. 
2.4.5.2 The inherent rights approach 
On the other end of the spectrum, Judge Van Zyl departed from these decisions 
and created controversy by delivering his decision in Van Erk v Holmer.100 The 
Court recognised that there was a shortage of legal authority in disputes 
involving the access rights of the unwed father and as a solution, Van Zyl J 
appealed to principles of justice and equity to build on the existent law. He 
quoted authors Ohannesian, Steyn and Boberg as authority for the proposition 
95 Douglas v Mayers op cit 914 E 
96 Please see Chapter 2.3 .1 supra 
97 Kindly see Chapter 2.4.1 
98 op cit 
99 F v B 1988 (3)SA948 (D) 
100 Van Erk v Holmer op cit 
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that the time was ripe for courts to keep with modern thinking and for the courts 
to relax their stance on unwed fathers. 101 
"I believe that the time has indeed arrived for the recognition by our Courts of an inherent 
right of access by a natural father to his illegitimate child. That such right should be 
recognised is amply justified by the precepts of justice, equity and reasonableness and by 
the demands of public policy." 
This decision caused a stir in the legal community, not only because the Court 
quoted from glossy magazines such as 'Fair Lady' but also because it flew in the 
face of long decided authority. The case ignored binding authority and the 
principle of stare decisis by turning away from inter alia, the F v L 102decision. 
While the Court's attempts to meet the changing needs of society are to be 
applauded, this decision predates the Constitution and as such the Court's 
reliance on principles of justice and equity were, it is submitted, out of place. 
The South African Common Law prescribes a strict hierarchy of legal authority, 
which the Court blatantly disregarded. The Court did support its decision on the 
basis that a legal lacuna calls for the reliance on principles of equity. However, 
while there are confused elements of the law relating to natural fathers, the F v 
.b 103 decision clearly lays down that a natural father has no inherent right of 
access to his child. The Courts procedural departure was not the only to attract 
criticism. Substantively, the move in favour of the father was criticised as being 
too father - centred and of losing sight of the child's best interests. Authors such 
as Clark104caution, 
''The Courts should always have regard to the practical aspects of access and any 
positive benefit that would accrue to the child. Factors such as the possible destabilisation 
101 Van Erk v Holmer op cit at p 650 
102 F v L op cit 
103 F v L op cit 
104 Clark, " Should the Unmarried father have an inherent access to his child?"565-569 
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of a child's new family unit by a biological father who had hitherto taken no interest in a 
child should not be downplayed. The circumstances of birth outside marriage vary greatly. 
Fears of violence and other forms of intimidation or interference cannot be disregarded. 
To bestow an inherent right of access on a father who has maintained no relationship with 
the mother and child and who has made no effort either to voluntarily acknowledge 
paternity or to discharge his obligations thereto, is, in my view, to place the interests of an 
unmarried father above the welfare of the child." 
It is submitted that the criticism of Clark is valid. The Court had quoted the article 
of Boberg, which seems to be written from the father's perspective Despite 
Boberg paying lip service to the 'best interest' principle, it is respectfully 
submitted that his argument falls foul thereof. One of the quoted extracts stated, 
"If a man is sufficiently concerned to seek to establish his paternity of a child despite his 
concomitant duty of support in order to enjoy access to that child, the law should claw the 
(perhaps tenuous) authorities to affirm the right of access rather than being astute to deny 
it." 
This attitude is to be discouraged as it returns to the quid pro quo approach, 
which seeks to reward a father with access. It is inappropriate to accord a father 
a right in this manner without considering the effect that it would have on the 
child. It is not sufficient to show that a father recognises his paternity for him to 
be awarded access. 
This is not to say that the Van Erk 105 decision is without merit, as not only did it 
bring the plight of the unmarried father into the centre stage of legal commentary 
but it also provided a useful counter balance to the precedent which leans so 
strongly towards the exclusive parenting role of the mother in cases concerning 
extra-marital children. It also challenged the role of the judiciary in Family Law 
and bravely rebelled against the traditional non-interventionist legacy in South 
Africa. Unfortunately the result was that the Court appears to have over 
105 Van Erk v Holmer op cit 
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compensated for the possible injustices of past precedent by adopting a 
maverick stance based on very scarce authority. 
2.4.5.3 The intermediate approach 
In 1995, the Appellate Division confirmed the via media between the two 
extremes outlined above. In B v S, 106 Judge Howie correctly applied the best 
interest principle. While he confirmed the judgements of F v L 107 and B v P, 108 he 
rejected Van Erk v Holmer (supra) on a number of grounds, including the fact 
that Van Zyl J ignored binding authority. Howie J stated that Van Zyl J exceeded 
his judicial function by effectively assuming the role of the legislature in making 
law. Howie J held that a father did not have an inherent right of access but that 
he was entitled to access if he could prove that it was in the best interests of the 
child. 109 
Howie J set out in great detail the factors to be considered in determining the 
question of whether access would be in the child's best interests. He relied on 
English authority and pronounced that the Court would consider, "the degree of 
commitment which the father has shown towards the child, the degree of 
attachment which exists between the father and the child, the reason of the 
father for applying for the order." The Court went on to state, correctly it is 
submitted, that in applying these principles it would be in keeping with the South 
African Law Commission Report on A Father's Right in Respect of his Illegitimate 
Child. 
The most recent case involving access, T v M,110which emanated from the 
Appellate Division, was decided shortly before the Fraser111 decision. The Court 
106 B v S op cit , 
107 F v L op cit 
108 B v P op cit 
109 B v Sop cit at p p579 par F-1 
110 T v M 1997(1)SA 54 
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followed the B v S112 decision very closely and applied the tests formulated by 
Judge Howie. 
The Court is to be commended for upholding the rights of children and 
developing the law to the extent that it conforms to international trends. The 
Court declared at p 57 par I, 
" .. (l)t is the right or entitlement of the child to have access or to be spared access, that 
determines whether contact with the non-custodian parent will be granted." 113 
Here the Court correctly focuses on the child's right of access to his or her father 
and not vice versa. This reflects the move away from parental rights towards 
parental responsibilities, which is evident in academic writings and many foreign 
jurisdictions. In that case the Court found that in principle there was no reason 
why contact should not be maintained between the natural father and his 
daughter. However, as over two years had elapsed since the matter was heard 
at the Court a quo, Judge Scott held that the matter was to be referred for the 
hearing of further evidence. 114 The Court confirmed the 8 v S115 decision and 
emphasised that the facts of the case were to form the focus of the matter. 
The intermediate approach adopted in the 8 v S 116and subsequently followed in 
the T v M 117decision has provided the most workable solution. It will be shown 
below that the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997 
provides a very similar answer to this vexed question. While legal practitioners 
might have wished for a decision which would eliminate some of the 
uncertainties which have been passed down through the conflicting precedent, 
111 Fraser op cit 
112 B v Sop cit 
113 T v M op cit p 57 par I 
114 T v M op cit p 60 
115 BvSopcit 
116 ibid 
117 T v Mop cit 
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the Court addressed this by calling upon Parliament to effect legislation to this 
aim.11a 
2.4.6 Adoption 
A natural father's consent was not required in the adoption proceedings of an 
extra-marital child. 119ln terms of the Child Care Act 7 4 of 1983, in cases where 
the child was legitimate, the consent of both parents was required. However 
where the child was born out of wedlock, only the consent of the mother was 
required. Further it was not a requirement in the act that the natural father 
receive notice of the adoption proceedings.120 It was commented by Clark and 
Van Heerden that the father could join the proceedings to the adoption through 
regulation 4(2) of the above act which provides that any party with an interest in 
the proceedings might approach the Court to be heard. 121 However, in practice 
this was seldom the case, especially as the father was often ignorant of the 
proceedings. 
It was suggested in the case of W v S122 that the Courts would in all probability 
rule it to be in the interests of the child to give the father notification of such 
proceedings. 123 However, the Court did not rule decisively either way and once 
again the question of the natural father's legal role was skirted. It is submitted 
that the law in relation to adoption proceedings disregarded the natural father to 
an extent, which could not be justified. This Section placed the father in an 
iniquitous position. In addition the interests of the child were not served in 
instances where the father was denied the opportunity of having his claims in 
adoption proceedings heard. 
118 T v M op cit p579 par J 
119 S 18(4)d Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
12° Clark and Van Heerden op cit p 42 
121 ibid 
122 w Vs 1988 ( 1) SA 475 
123 W v S op cit at p 496 
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3. THE POSITION FROM 1997 TO THE PRESENT. 
3.1 The Fraser Judgements 
The above case has captured the attention of the South African public. While the 
phrase, the 'Fraser judgement' has become a household term, it would be more 
appropriate to speak of the Fraser judgements as the saga has played itself out 
before no less than five courtrooms. The central figures involved in the human 
drama were the natural father, Fraser and his former lover, Naude. Naude fell 
pregnant with their child and soon afterwards their relationship ended. Naude 
made the decision while still pregnant to have her child adopted. Fraser however 
· wished to keep the child and expressed his opposition to the adoption. This 
would spell the beginning of five long years of court battles waged by Fraser 
(and ultimately an alleged kidnapping attempt) to fight the adoption. 
Fraser first approached the Witwatersrand Local Division while Naude was still 
pregnant for an interdict preventing the adoption.124 The Court denied him this 
relief on· the basis that he had not displayed a prima facie right arising from 
statute or Common Law to substantiate his claim. The child, Timothy was born 
and the adoption proceedings began. Fraser then wrote to the M.inister of Justice 
requesting him to instruct the Commissioner of Child Welfare to grant him the 
right to oppose the adoption proceedings in the Children's Court. The Minister 
responded as follows, 125 
"Despite the current legal position, the minister respects the rights of parents and children 
enshrined in our Constitution and in pursuance thereof believes that your client should at 
least be afforded the opportunity to be heard by the relevant Commissioner." 
124 Fraser v Naude 1997 (2) SA 82 (W) 
125 Fraser v Childrens Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 218 (T)at p 221F 
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As stated above the consent of the Natural Father was not required in adoption 
proceedings and as a consequence thereof, Fraser's opposition to the adoption 
was not considered by the Court to be an obstacle to the adoption. Fraser had 
endeavoured to substantiate his rights as father at the adoption proceedings He 
further alleged that the adoption would not be in the child's best interests. The 
Children's Court considered the request for the recognition of such rights by 
referring to the best interests of the child and to the English case Re H126 which 
was approved in B v S.127 
The Court applied the same three factors approved in those cases to determine 
the existence of a right on the part of the father to prevent the adoption and the 
best interests of the child 128• The first factor is the degree of commitment, which 
the father has showed towards the child. The second is the degree of attachment 
between the father and the child. The Court found that Fraser had succeeded on 
these two tests. However the third factor considered is the applicant's reason for 
applying for the relief and on this ground Fraser failed. 
The Court's decision in this regard was summarised as follows, 129 
" The Commissioner held that the applicant was not really concerned with the suitability of 
the adoptive parents but rather with an attempt to gain custody and parental authority for 
himself." 
Fraser further demanded that the Court refer the matter to the Constitutional 
Court. He asked that the matter be referred for viva voce evidence and he 
launched a counter- application for adoption. As Preiss J stated in the 
subsequent review proceedings, 130 
126 Re Hand another (1991]2 ALL ER 185 
127 op cit at p 583 
128 Fraser v Childrens Court op cit p 223 
129 Fraser v Childrens Court op cit p 224 at par A-E 
130 op cit at p 222 par D 
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"The applicant was relying upon every conceivable legal step in order to contest the 
proposed adoption." 
Despite the Minister's pledge of support and the concerted efforts of Fraser, the 
adoption was approved by the Children's Court Pretoria in February 1995. Fraser 
then brought an urgent application reviewing the decision of the Children's Court. 
Much of his argument rested on principles of Administrative Law as he wished to 
have the Commissioner's decision set aside on the basis that he was not 
afforded a fair hearing in terms of the audi alteram partem rule. 131 Fraser further 
claimed in his application an order declaring the relevant provisions of the Act 
invalid insofar as they conflict with the Constitution. 
The matter came before Judge Preiss. The Court focused on Regulation 4 (1) of 
the Child Care Act, 132 
"a parent ... of a child in respect of whom a children's court holds an inquiry ... shall have 
the same rights and powers as a party to a civil action in a magistrates court in respect of 
the examination of witnesses, the production of evidence etc. " 
Although it was argued against Fraser that he did not fall under the term "parent" 
because he was not married to Naude, the Court (correctly it is submitted) 
rejected this interpretation and held that he was a 'parent' for the purposes of the 
Child Care Act. 133 The Court concluded that Fraser had not been afforded these 
rights and powers in that his request for viva voce evidence had been denied. 
The Court found that the denial of such rights amounted to a gross irregularity 
and consequently set the adoption procedure aside. 
131 Fraser v Childrens Court Pretoria North op cit 
132 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
133 74 of 1983 
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The Court then did not have to decide whether the section offended against the 
Constitution and whether it was invalid. However Judge Preiss held that this was 
a matter which should be referred to the Constitutional Court. 
3.1.1 The Constitutional Court Decision 
The matter then came before the then Judge Mahomed, Deputy President of the 
Constitutional Court. The Court considered whether Section 18(4) d violated the 
right to equality in terms of sections 8 (1) and 8(2) of the Constitution. While 
S8(1) guarantees the right to each person to equal treatment before the law and 
equal protection by the law, S8(2) entrenches the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated on any one of the listed grounds. 134While legal commentators are 
uncertain whether these grounds form a numerus clausus, 135 the grounds form a 
rather exhaustive list, and include inter alia; race, gender, sex, ethnic or social 
origin ... religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. 
The Court went on to acknowledge that as significant as the right is that there 
are circumstances under which it might be limited through the application of the 
limitation clause, the then Section 33 of the Interim Constitution. The Court 
ultimately found that S18(4)d 'offends' the equality clause. This conclusion was 
founded on three different grounds of discrimination. 
Firstly, it was held that the section discriminated against certain fathers who had 
solemnised their union with the mother according to custom. The judge focused 
on the status of Islamic marriages. He noted that as a result of the fact that these 
unions are not accorded any recognition in South African Law that the father of a 
child born of such a union would not be required to consent to the adoption of his 
child. These unions were distinguished from unions solemnised in terms of 
African Customary Law which had been accorded limited legal recognition in 
134 S8(2) states ''No person shall be unfairly discriminated against; directly or indirectly ... on one or more of 
the following grounds ... " 
39 
terms of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. The effect of that act was that 
such a union was deemed a marriage for the purposes of the Child Care Act136 
and the consent of the father was thus required. The distinction between these 
unions was held to be discriminatory and could not be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause. The Court stated in response thereto, 137 
'This invasion of section 8 of the Constitution is in my view clearly not reasonable and not 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality." 
Mahomed DP then considered the second ground, discrimination on the basis of 
gender and commented, 
"The attack on the impugned section based on gender discrimination is that the only 
difference between the mother and father of a child born in consequence of a relationship 
not formalised through marriage is the difference in genders."138 
The judge considered whether there could be a justifiable reason for a distinction 
on the basis of gender and displayed an attitude of caution in this regard. 
Mahomed DP did not make a bold statement and suggest that there were no 
circumstances under which such a distinction was permissible. In fact he 
acknowledged that there were instances in which such a distinction could be 
justified. However he considered whether the section was so broad as to 
introduce distinctions which would not be justifiable. While the Court did not 
expressly state how it arrived at the conclusion that the discrimination could not 
be upheld through a reliance on the limitation clause, it is clear that the court 
applied the principles of proportionality. 
135 Chaskalson et al op cit par 
136 74 of 1983 
137 op cit p 273 at par F 
138 ibid 
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South African Courts have followed the Canadian approach first espoused in 
Regina v Oakes, 139 which was approved in Quozeleni v Minister of Law and 
Order.140This test lays down that once it has been established that a right has 
been infringed it must then be asked if that infringement is rationally connected 
to a Government objective. The Government aim must be important enough to 
warrant a departure from a right. The impairment must limit the right to the least 
extent possible, in a manner proportionate to the objective. 141This would mean 
that the end to which the restriction is designed would have to be compelling and 
the means employed to reach them, fitting. 
In the Fraser142 judgement the Court recognised an infringement of the right not 
to be discriminated against unfairly. The Court acknowledged that there might be 
rationality to a distinction in the initial phase after the child is born as the mother 
has a biological connection with the child. However this rationality does not 
extend beyond the first. year or so after the child is born. As the unwed father's 
consent is not required regardless of the age of the child placed for adoption and 
surrounding circumstances, it cannot be said that the limitation is rational. There 
is no provision for circumstances when the father is actively involved in the 
child's upbringing and for instances when the mother is an absentee parent. 
S18 (4)d does not serve to achieve an important purpose, nor is it well tailored to 
effect a specific end.143 
The third attack on the section was based on the discrimination between married 
and unmarried fathers. The Court recognised the need for laws which protect the 
sanctity of the marriage institution and postulated that there might be 
circumstances where it would be appropriate to distinguish between persons on 
that ground. The Court considered the possible results of a provision, whereby 
139 [1986]1 SCR 103,26 DLR (4TH)200 
140 Quozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994(3) SA625 (E) 
141 Chaskalson et al par 12.1.c 
142 op cit 
41 
an involved father who had not been married to the child's mother would be 
arbitrarily excluded from having a say at the proceedings, while a married father 
who had shown no interest in the child would be consulted. On that basis it was 
held that the distinction was untenable. 
The Court went on to consider the alternative to the offending provision and 
cautioned that the requirement of the consent of all unmarried fathers on a 
blanket rule could have undesirable results. 144The judge referred specifically to 
instances where the child was conceived out of rape and/or incest. The Court 
concluded that there are so many anomalous results which could be caused by 
rigid regulation which either accords a general 'veto right' to all fathers or which 
denies all fathers any say in the matter. The Court acknowledged the weighty 
task awaiting Parliament in providing for the myriad of possibilities. The Court 
therefore called for entirely new legislation in the matter and not simply a 
rectification of the impugned section and stated,145 
"It is in the interests of Justice and good Government that there would be proper 
legislation to regulate the rights of parents in relation to the adoption of any child born out 
of a relationship between them which has not been formalised by marriage." 
3.1.2 Commentary on the Constitutional Judgement 
Before the relevance of the above case is considered, it is important to consider 
the possible reasons behind the reluctance on the part of the South African 
judiciary to pronounce on the position of unwed fathers in the past. The 
traditional view, regarding divided gender roles has already received extensive 
discussion above. One of the other reasons for such reluctance offered by 
Boberg 146was that in acknowledging these rights, the Court might be seen to be 
condoning extra- marital sex and perhaps even encouraging such behaviour. 
143 Fraser v Childrens Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) 
144 op cit p 275 
145 op cit p284 par A 
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Further the judges were wary of what they considered to be an undermining of 
the institution of marriage and the encouragement of cohabitation. As the ruling 
power in South Africa was traditionally conservative, it is not surprising that such 
views were held by the judiciary. 
In many of the judgements the facts were that the mother had subsequently 
married a third party and as such wished the step-father to assume the paternal 
role. As the Courts were so intent on upholding "family values", there were many 
decisions which deprived fathers of access rights in a bid to integrate the new 
family. 147The best interests of the child were then determined according to a 
narrow understanding of the family unit, where the married mother and father 
figures were to be regarded as the most appropriate care givers often to the 
detriment of the natural father -child relationship. Today the concept of family has 
been changing allowing a broader understanding of the term but so too has the 
role of the judiciary. These changes combined with the introduction of a 
constitutional age has led to definite development in this area. 
The Court is to be lauded for taking a bold stand and pronouncing, not only on 
the role of the natural father but on the application of the Right to equality. The 
Court did not hesitate to advocate certain societal values to be protected and 
fostered by Government. The Court in so doing moved away from the non-
interventionist approach so often adopted in the past. 
In this case the Court incorporated principles of public policy and appealed to 
social realities without ousting basic legal principles as Van Zyl J had done in the 
aforementioned judgement of Van Erk v Holmer.148However in order to compare 
these judgements it is important to note the different contexts within which they 
146 Boberg "Sins of the Fathers.The law's retribution" Op cit p 36 
147 F v L op cit, B v P op cit 
148 op cit 
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were declared. Although the two judgements were passed within five years of 
each other, the earlier was decided before the advent of the Constitution. 
The later judgement reveals more than a changed perspective on the position of 
the unwed father, it highlights the changed role of the courts. The courts have 
been empowered to review and reform laws in order that they be consistent with 
changed social values. The Fraser Judgement was concerned with the 
application of the value of equality between persons. This value has been hailed 
as the core value underpinning the entire Constitution. The Court recognised the 
significance of the right to equality and stated, 149 
"There can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of the 
Constitution. It permeates and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is 
premised." 
As the Constitutional Court is based upon a set of Fundamental Rights, it is 
capable of upholding certain norms and morals. Mahomed DP appropriately then 
applied a value judgement. However it is submitted that Van Zyl J confused 
public opinion with such core values. 
The Court in S v Makwanyane 150warns against the forming of a decision based 
on public opinion. First it cautions that most sources of public opinion are difficult 
to substantiate. Van Zyl seemed to rely on opinion reflected in magazine articles 
which is not necessarily reflective of public opinion. The Court then states that a 
court should not to rule so as to gain public favour. Otherwise the Court may be 
inclined to disregard the claims of marginalised social groups. Public opinion was 
found to be an issue to be assessed by Parliament and not by the Judiciary.151 
149 Fraser op cit at p 272 parA 
150 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665(CC) 
151 ibid 
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In an assessment of a South African Constitutional Court decision it is usual to 
refer to the Canadian precedent. As our Bill of Rights is modelled to a large 
extent on the Canadian Charter of Rights, it is useful to gain from their 
experience in applying these rights. In that instance Mahomed DP looked to the 
leading Canadian case on point, Re Macvicar and Superintendent Family and 
Child Services 152for guidance. 
The facts of that case were similar to the Fraser judgement. A British Columbian 
statute, The Adoption Act, had dispensed with the consent of a natural father in 
adoption proceedings. This statute was challenged by a natural father on the 
grounds that it denied him the right to equality enshrined in the Charter. 
The father alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of gender and 
on the basis of marital status. The Court looked at the Adoption Act and applied 
the proportionality test to assess whether the ostensible differentiation might be 
justifiable. The Court concluded that the biological differences between genders 
could not justify such a discrimination particularly as, 153 
'The Act itself recognises that sex is irrelevant because included in those who must 
consent are males who have married the mother." 
It was held that the distinctions were a violation of the natural father's right to 
equality. It was held further that it was in the best interests of the child that the 
father is required to consent so that the natural bonds that a child has with his or 
her parents are not easily severed. 154 
As the rights of the child did not receive attention in the Fraser judgement, it is 
interesting to note the argument in the Canadian case. It was argued that it was 
152 1986 34 DLR (4th) 488 
153 op cit p 496 
154 op cit p 494 
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in the best interests of the child that the adoption proceedings are dealt with 
speedily and that the natural fathers' consent should be dispensed with. This 
argument was rejected by the Court. The Court held that the parent is best 
placed to decide on the adoption of his or her child. The Court held further that 
while parental rights are secondary to that of children's that they do still exist. 155 
It is averred that the Court applied the rights of both parents and children 
correctly in this instance. 
It is submitted that as the South African limitation clause is similar to the 
Canadian example that it is fair to rely on that precedent. The correctness of the 
Fraser judgement156 is therefore reinforced by the Re Macvicar 157decision. 
While the judgement of the Constitutional Court has received praise from various 
commentators, it has also attracted criticism. As Mahomed DP held that there 
were instances in which the roles of men and women could validly be 
distinguished, the Court was criticised in not going far enough in pronouncing on 
gender inequality. Sinclair had raised concerns about notions of parenthood and 
their effect on the role of women in society. She opined that until notions of 
gender roles changed whereby unwed fathers would be granted equal parental 
authority, that women would continue to be subordinated. 158 
Mahomed DP has taken a different standpoint in his judgement. He recognised 
that women are still the primary care-givers and considered the hardships that 
might be suffered by single mothers were natural fathers to be treated identically 
to them in law. In so doing he applied a substantive interpretation to the right of 
equality. 
155 op cit p 494 
156 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261(CC) 
157 Re Mac Vicar op cit 
158 Sinclair op cit p 539 
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Constitutional writers seem to agree in general that the content of Section 14 of 
the Final Constitution and Section 8 of the Interim Constitution is substantive, as 
Kentridge J stated, 159 
"A formal approach to equality assumes that inequality is aberrant and that it can be 
eradicated simply by treating all individuals in exactly the same way. A substantive 
approach to equality on the other hand does not presuppose a social order It accepts the 
past patterns of discrimination have left their scars upon the present. Treating all persons 
in a formally equal way now is not going to change the patterns of the past, or that 
inequality needs to be redressed and not simply removed." 
The interpretation of the equality clause, as suggested in this extract has been 
purposive and further evidence of the fact that the right is not formal in nature is 
the extensive affirmative action provision, which is, provided in Section 8 (3). A 
formal notion of equality is usually inconsistent with a programme of affirmative 
action. This is because a formal right to equality vests in the individual and may 
not be departed from for the upliftment of the group. The formal notion is more 
suited to individualist western liberal democracies such as the United States 
where there is less emphasis on social design and more on equality of 
opportunity for each person. Our Constitution on the other hand emphasises 
upliftment of groups. 160 
In the Fraser case then it is submitted that the court did not detract from the 
rights of women. As Cockrell stated, 161 
"It is submitted that in the standard scenario, where the mother and father of an extra-
marital child live apart and the child lives with the mother, the existing common-law rule 
which regards the mother as the natural guardian to the exclusion of the father is justified 
159 Kentridge "Equality" in Chaskalson et al op cit par 14.4 
160 ibid 
161 Cockrell A as quoted in Bronstein op cit p 34.7 
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by deep notions of substantive equality and should not be held to be in violation of the 
father's constitutional right to equality". 
This approach has been endorsed by the Constitutional Court in a number of 
decisions regarding the right of equality. President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo 162 is a Constitutional Court decision which was reported in the 
same year as the Fraser163 judgement. Like the Fraser 164 case it centred on the 
question of gender equality. The facts of that case were briefly that the President 
was considering releasing certain prisoners who were mothers of children under 
the age of twelve. This act was challenged on the basis that it discriminated on 
grounds of gender. Significantly, Judge O' Regan in her majority decision looked 
at the State's reasoning for differentiating between mothers and fathers on the 
basis of gender. In order to establish whether the differentiation was unlawful in 
terms of Section 8, she focused on the wording of S 8(2) and more particularly 
on the term "unfairly discriminated". 
The Court stated at para 41, 
"We need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that although a 
society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and 
freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in 
all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case will therefore require a careful 
and thorough understanding of the impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular 
people concerned to determine whether its overall impact is one which further the 
constitutional goal of equality or not." 165 
This excerpt confirms that the Equality Clause is goal orientated and as such is 
substantive in nature. 
162 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SAl CC 
163 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North op cit 
164 ibid 
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This understanding is borne out by the wording of Section 8(2). As S 8(2) 
outlaws only discrimination which is unfair it stands to reason that some forms of 
discrimination were envisaged by the drafters to be fair. 
This appears to be the approach adopted by Mahomed DP as he considered the 
factors relevant to both the position of both the single mother and single father in 
society and he based his decision on the effect that the alleged discrimination 
would have on both. He was mindful of the disadvantages suffered by fathers in 
terms of the legislation while at the same time was sympathetic to the socio-
economic plight of single mothers. 
It would appear that while some feminist writers have demanded a changed 
notion of family roles, the Court has gone further by considering the practical 
needs and best interests of those mothers and children who would be most 
affected by legislation in this regard. While some commentators might criticise 
Mahomed for discriminating between the genders by not applying the Aristotlean 
concept of equality whereby all people are to be treated equally, it is submitted 
that his interpretation of the content of the equality clause is the correct one. 
Another criticism levelled at the court was that the decision was taken from a 
stance which favoured the interests of the parent over those of the child. A 
recent commentary by Mosikatsana states, 166 
"The Constitutional Court decision in Fraser was parent-centred. It addressed only the 
competing property interests that the natural parents had in their child. Mahomed DP did 
not factor the child's best interests in the equation of competing parental rights, whereas s 
28(2) of the Constitution by the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, instructs us that 
'[a) child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child'." 
165 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo op cit par 41.1 
166 Mosikatsana, "Law of Persons and Family Law" Annual Survey ofS A Law p 154 
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The relevant portions of Section 28 state, 
"Children 
(1) Every Child has the right -
(b) to family care or parental care ... 
(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child" 
This section confirms the supremacy of'the best interest test but at the same 
time stipulates that children are entitled to parental care. This right then clearly 
'trumps' a father's parental right. It will be interesting to see whether the 
Constitutional Court will include the right of access as an element of parental 
care. If so then the child would have a fundamental right to have contact with his 
parents, subject to the best interest consideration. 
While it is noteworthy that nowhere in the judgement is there mention of the 
rights of the child enshrined in the Constitution, it would appear that the Court is 
not completely to blame for the apparent oversight. Nowhere has it been 
recorded in the judgement that this was a right relied upon by any party to the 
dispute. The neglect of the section dealing with the rights of the child therefore 
runs far deeper than this judgement. The attack made by Mosikatsana should be· 
levelled at not only at the Courts but at South African Family Law jurisprudence 
as a whole. Other jurisdictions have moved away from the concept of 'parental 
rights' and speak more in terms of 'parental duties'167owed to the child. South 
Africa has certainly shown a move in this direction through the Appellate Division 
judgement of B v S168 and the incorporation of Section 28 into the Final 
167 Cretney SM & Masson JM Principles of Family Law p 638 
168 B v S op cit 
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Constitution. However our jurisprudence would have to break away from the 
Roman Dutch concept and terminology of 'parental power' to effect this shift. 
It is disappointing that Mahomed DP did not embrace the powers he had as 
Constitutional Court Judge to pronounce more boldly on the legal status of 
customary unions. He compares the disadvantaged position of the Islamic union 
with that of the African Customary union. This seems an unsatisfactory approach 
and it is unclear why it was necessary to speak in relative terms altogether. It is 
unclear why these unions should continue to suffer unfair discrimination at all. 
There are writers who fear that the recognition of these unions will conflict with 
the values of the Constitution. Their reasoning is that some customary legal 
systems have elements of patriarchy and paternalism, which tend to subjugate 
women. 169 This does not seem sufficient cause for the Law to turn a blind eye to 
these unions. 
Firstly the parties to these unions are vested with the right to Freedom of 
Religion, Belief and Conscience.170 Secondly if these unions were recognised 
then at least they would be subject to Civil Law regulations, which have, 
mechanisms designed to protect women. At present a woman party to an Islamic 
union cannot rely on maintenance laws, laws of intestate succession and Motor 
Vehicle Accident Legislation. Thirdly, the fact that African Customary unions 
have been recognised in recent legislation means that it is possible for 
Parliament to accord these unions validity without derogating from women's 
rights. 
169 Sinclair op cit p 561 
170 Section 30 Final Constitution 
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In all the Fraser judgement171 is a considered and equitable decision. The Court 
is to be commended for providing for the wide spectru\ of people who would 
come to be affected by such a decision. While Lawrie Fraser himself did not 
benefit personally in that his child was not removed from hi~dopted parents, it 
altered the position of the natural father immeasurably.172 \ 
3.2 Legislative Development 
3.2.1 The South African Law Commission Report on the Rights of a Father 
in respect of his Illegitimate Child 
The Natural Fathers Act 173was based very firmly on the SALC Report published 
in 1994.174 The report comprised a thorough investigation by leading legal 
practitioners and academics. 
"The Commission considers in this report the question whether the Common Law position 
as it applies at present according to which the mother of an illegitimate child has exclusive 
rights such as guardianship, custody and access requires reform."175 
The Commission considered the prevailing Common Law, Customary Law and 
Foreign legal systems. The leading academic writings on the topic then received 
close attention. Based on these materials and various discussions the 
Commission produced two options for future legislation and invited comments 
from the legal fraternity as to which option was preferable. 
The first option recommended that the parental power remain vested in the 
mother but that the father be granted leave to apply to the High Court for an 
171 Fraser v Childrens Court Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 
172 In the 1999 reported decision ofNaude v Fraser 1998 (8)BCLR 945(SCA), the judgement of Preiss J 
was overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The validity of the adoption proceedings conducted by 
the Pretoria Children's Court was upheld. 
173 86 of 1997 
174 SALC Report on the Rights of a father in respect of his illegitimate Child 1994 
175 op cit at par I. IO 
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order granting him, custody, guardianship and /or access to his child.176The 
SALC then recommended further that in instances where guardianship or 
custody was to be awarded to someone other than the mother or where the child 
was placed for adoption that the father be granted preferential rights in respect of 
the child. The proposal recommended that natural fathers be notified of pending 
adoption proceedings so that he might have an opportunity to lodge an adoption 
application. 177 
This option does not make great inroads into the Common Law position. It 
confirms mainstream judicial reasoning of F v L 178 and B v P .179lt does this by 
resting the onus on the father to apply for parental rights. It is significant that the 
Commission has clarified that the father is in a preferential position to other third 
parties in respect of his child and as such lays to rest the problematic decisions 
of Docrat180 and Douglas181 where the father was considered a legal stranger to 
the child. 
This option continued to include the various factors which were to be considered 
by the courts in evaluating an application by the father for rights of access. 
These focused on the relationship between the mother and the natural father, 
the relationship of the child to each parent or to another person, the effect that 
separating the child from either parent from the mother or natural father or 
another person might have on the child and the child's attitude to the possible 
access. Interestingly these enquiries were only proposed in respect of 
applications for access. It is unclear whether they were to apply in respect of the 
claims for custody and guardianship. The list was to assist the courts in 
176 SALC Report op cit par 7.3 
177 ibid 
178 F v Lop cit 
179 B v P op cit 
180Docrat v Bhayat op cit 
181 Douglas v Mayer op cit 
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assessing the best interests of the child which was ultimately to be the 
determining factor. 
The second option granted an inherent right of access to the father, thereby 
imposing an onus on the mother to approach Court to object to the father 
exercising access. The latter option proposed the same procedure as the first in 
respect of custody and guardianship. This option stipulated that the father should 
be given notice of pending adoption proceedings and that he should receive a 
fair hearing. 182 
The latter option seems to conform more to the Van Erk183 judgement and is a 
clear departure from the traditional standpoint. The rights of the father are 
advanced in this proposal both in respect of his rights to access and in respect of 
adoption proceedings. 
The comments received by the Commission indicated that there was equal 
support for both propositions.184 The SALC ultimately supported the first option 
and in so doing followed the intermediate approach discussed above. The main 
reason for this choice seemed to be a concern for the women, usually single 
mothers, who would have to bear the financial burden of litigating. The SALC 
was conscious that as a class these women are already disadvantaged and 
often are not capable of bearing these costs.185 
Interestingly this concern was raised by academics, specifically Clark and Van 
Heerden 186 who were against granting a father an inherent right of access 
182 SALC Report op cit par 7.3 
183 Van Erk v Holmer op cit 
184 SALC Report op cit par 8 .4 
185 ibid 
186 Clark and Van Hererden op cit p56 
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because they doubted whether litigation would be accessible to women. Van Zyl 
J attacked the opinion of Clark an9 Van Heerden in Van Erk187 where he asked, 
"Why should it be any more difficult for the mother to approach the Court than it is for the 
father?" 188 
It is submitted that this question is na·ive and in fact easily answerable. A 
contested High Court application of this nature could cost the applicant anywhere 
from R20 000.00 upwards in attorneys' fees and disbursements. Even if the 
applicant is granted a cost award in her favour, most attorneys firms would 
demand a sizeable deposit from their cli~nt before embarking on such litigation. 
Although the Commission postulated that these matters might be heard at the 
Magistrates Courts, this has not been the case. 189 It is common cause that single 
mothers, generally speaking, do not receive an income close to, or equal to that 
of single fathers. Hence it is more difficult for them to approach the Court for 
relief. It is submitted that the reasoning of the SALC is therefore convincing and 
that the first proposal provides a more realistic blue print for regulation in this 
regard. 
The Commission stated,190 
"The Bill confirms for the most part the Common Law position but seeks to effect legal 
certainty and to establish guidelines on the basis of which the courts may settle disputes 
of this nature." 
187 Van Erk v Holmer op cit 
188 op cit at p 649 
189 
Although the Southern Divorce Court has been set up in Cape Town Magistrates Court as of January 1999, the 
Registrar of that Court informed me telephonically that that Court was only hearing matters which have arisen out of 
marriage and as such would not entertain applications relating to extra-marital children. 
190 SALC op cit par 8.19 
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Hence it is clear that the changes proposed were not aimed at a remodelling of 
the legal system but rather on the laying down of procedure whereby the father's 
rights might be evaluated and established. 
3.2.2 The Natural Fathers Act 
Although the Commission report was published in 1994, the act was assented to 
in November 1997, a few months after the delivery of the Fraser judgement.191 It 
has been commented that the eventual passing of the Act was as a 
consequence of the heightened public pressure which existed in the wake of the 
case. 192 
The preamble to the act includes as its purposes the following, 193 
"To make provision for the possibility of access to and custody and guardianship of 
children born out of wedlock by their Natural Fathers, ... to provide for the notification of 
Natural Fathers of any intended adoption of their children born out of wedlock." 
It is interesting to note that all the act can provide for is the "possibility" of 
access, custody and guardianship. It is then clear from the outset that the act 
speaks in guarded terms about paternal rights. 
The act goes on to define the term, "child born out of wedlock"' and maintains the 
Common Law position by stating, 
"a child whose natural parents were not married to each other at the time of such child's 
conception or at any time thereafter." 
Section 2 of the act is headed, "access to and custody and guardianship of 
children born out of wedlock by natural fathers." This provision follows the SALC 
report very closely and stipulates that the father may make application to Court 
for an order granting him access, custody and guardianship on conditions to be 
191 Fraser v Childrens Court Pretoria North 1997{2)SA 261{CC) 
192 Bronstein op cit par 34.3 
) 
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determined by the Court. The Court is again to be guided by the best interests of 
the child at all times. The statute then goes on to compile a list which the Court is 
to consider in making such a determination.194 
This list includes those factors suggested by the SALC. It qualifies the enquiry 
into the relationship between the mother and father by directing that the Court is 
to pay special attention to whether there is a history of violence or abuse in the 
relationship or towards the child. This would appear to be a factor aimed at 
addressing the very real social issues facing many women and children in South 
Africa and of vital importance in assessing the future welfare of children in such a 
relationship. 
The act goes further than the report and adds the following to the list of factors; 
the degree of commitment the father has shown towards the child, (evinced 
through maintenance payments or the bearing of any birth costs) and the fact 
that the child was born of a customary or religious union. The child's attitude to 
the granting of an order is also considered. 
As the long awaited statutory guideline to a natural father's claim to parental 
authority, the act, like the report which preceded it, did not seem to make a 
marked change to the Common Law. However, one must be cautious not to be 
overly critical as, as already stated, there are many socio-economic realities 
which dictate that a drastic change could well endanger the welfare of the 
children and unwed mothers. The act does provide a working guideline to the 
procedure required and lends certainty by setting out the determining factors. 
Although most of these appear from the case law, they would assist legal 
practitioners in advising fathers of their chance of success in bringing such an 
application or those parties wishing to oppose. 
193 Act 86 of 1997 
194 Section 2 Act 86 of 1997 
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It is noteworthy that nowhere is there an indication of the relative weight carried 
by each factor, hence there might be some confusion until this provision is tested 
in Court. Parliament has also improved the lot of those fathers who are party to 
such unions by adding such a consideration to the list of factors. This would 
assist in overcoming the problems experienced by such fathers in the earlier 
cases referenced above.195 
The other section of the act which is relevant is Section 6 which provides that in 
adoption proceedings involving an extra-marital child, the adoption will not be 
ordered unless the natural father has been given written notice thereof. The 
natural father's role in adoption proceedings has received more attention in the 
subsequent act, The Adoption Matters Amendment Act.196 
3.2.3 The Adoption Matters Amendment Act 
While the Natural Father's Act has been said to owe its existence to the pressure 
caused by the Fraser judgement, the link between that judgement and the 
Adoption Matter's Amendment Act (hereinafter the Adoption Act) is far more 
direct. The Constitutional Court called upon the legislature to draft a new piece of 
legislation to correct the constitutional invalidity of Section 18(4 )(d). It was 
decided that a mere striking out of the section would not suffice. As the title of 
the act suggests, it serves to amend other pieces of legislation and does not 
constitute an act on its own. 
The preamble to the act states, 
"To provide for the rights of certain natural fathers where the adoption of their children 
born out of wedlock has been proposed and for certain notice to be given." 
195 Docrat v Bahyat supra, 
196 Act 56 of 1998 
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It is immediately clear that not all fathers are to be vested with the same rights as 
the statute provides for "certain natural fathers" only. While the act incorporates 
the same definition as the Natural Father's Act, it provides an interesting 
definition of the term, "natural father": 
"A male person whose gamete has contributed to the child as a result of a sexual 
relationship with the mother of such child." 
The question must then be asked why legislators have added the term "sexual 
relationship" to the definition. There seem to be two possible answers. Either the 
emphasis is to be placed on the word "sexual " in which case the drafters wished 
to exclude sperm donors from the ambit of the act. This seems to be 
unnecessary as The Children's Status Act197 provides that where a couple avail 
themselves of assisted reproduction techniques involving donor gametes, all ties 
between the donor and the child are severed and the child is deemed the 
legitimate child of the woman and her husband. The act could alternatively be 
focusing on the second word of the phrase "relationship" thereby requiring the 
parents to have conceived a child through an ongoing relationship and not 
merely through an act of rape. 
The body of the act amends the offending provisions of the Child Care Act 7 4 of 
1983. Section 17, which lists the categories of persons who may adopt a child, 
was amended in 1991 to include "unmarried persons" in the list of potential 
adoptive parents 198 • Before 1991 a natural father would not have been eligible to 
apply for the adoption of his child, if he was an unmarried person. It is submitted 
that this is an absurd state of affairs and it is the amendment is to be welcomed. 
The Adoption Act takes the matter even further by specifically inserting the 
197 82 of 1997 
198 Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991 
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category of the natural father as a class of person who might apply for the 
adoption of a child born out of wedlock. 
The crucial changes which were brought about by the Adoption Act were to 
Sections 18 and 19 of the Child Care Act. Section 18 ( 4 )( d) now reads that 
where a child is born out of wedlock that consent to his or her adoption is 
required by both parents whether or not such parents are minors or married. 
However the act qualifies that the natural father's consent will only be necessary 
where the father had acknowledged himself in writing to be the father and has 
made his whereabouts and identity known. 
Section 19A requires that a notice be served on a parent who has not offered his 
or her consent. It calls upon the parent to grant or withhold consent within 14 
days of the delivery of the notice or to advance reasons why his or her consent 
should not be dispensed with in terms of Section 19. In the case of the natural 
father, it allows him to apply for the child's adoption. 
Delivery of the Section 19A notice on natural fathers is only required in cases 
where the father has registered himself as the father in terms of The Births and 
Deaths Registration Act 1992. While the act safeguards the rights of children by 
requiring that only certain fathers are notified of pending adoption proceedings, 
the act does not provide for those fathers who may not have been notified of the 
birth. 
Section 19 provides a list of circumstances in which an adoption order might be 
effected without certain persons' consent. The new act provides that the in the 
cases of children born out of wedlock, the consent of the natural father who has 
not acknowledged himself as such or who has not responded to a notice 
provided for in the new section 19A is not required. 
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Section 19A provides further that the consent of a parent who has failed to 
discharge his or her parental duties without good cause shown shall also be 
dispensed with. This section is a very sensible addition as it avoids the possible 
consequences of a net of parental responsibility which is too widely cast. It was 
hypothesised in the SALC working paper that it might not be in the best interests 
of children to require the consent of certain parents who might deny such 
consent in order to be obstructive199• The act thus lays down a filtering 
mechanism whereby only those involved parents are required to consent. 
This section deals with Boberg's criticism,200 mentioned above, which posits that 
Courts should not penalise fathers for non-involvement with their children if such 
non-involvement is caused by the obstructive behaviour on the part of the 
mother. The new act provides that a parent who has failed to discharge his 
parental duties without "good cause shown" is not required to offer his or her 
consent to the adoption. Hence it must be asked as to the causes which would 
constitute "good cause". Presumably a father who has been prevented from 
discharging his duties by the mother of the child would be able to allege that he 
had "good cause" and would not be prejudiced by the mothersobstructiveness. 
The act goes on to recognise the very real social issues which unfortunately face 
many single mothers in this country. The act dispenses with the consent of those 
fathers who have conceived out of rape or incest or who have been found guilty 
of crimes of violence involving either the mother of the child or the child. This 
stipulation serves to strengthen the position of both the child and the unwed 
mother and as such is a particularly significant amendment. 
199 SALC Working Paper op cit par 8.20 
200 Boberg "The Sins of the Father" p 35 
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3.3 Recent case law 
There has been only one reported judgement subsequent to the Fraser2°1 
decision and the promulgation of The Natural Father's Act, Wicks v Fisher2°2 
However, even that case predated the commencement date of the said act. 
The Wicks v Fisher2°3 case concerned the application by a natural father for an 
interdict restraining the mother of the child, intent on emigrating, from taking the 
child with her to the United Kingdom. The father wished the interdict to operate 
as interim relief pending an application by him for custody of the child. Hence the 
nature and scope of a father's right to custody did not require attention by the 
Court, only the question of whether the father had a prima facie right to interim 
relief. The Court attempted to answer the question by considering whether he 
had made out a case of a reasonable prospect of success in a future custody 
application. 
The Court stated at p507 of the judgement, 
"It is quite clear that the applicant as the natural father, has a right to claim custody if it is 
proved that the custodian parent is not a fit and proper person to exercise custody, 
bearing in mind always that any decision in this regard will involve also what is in the best 
interests of the child. In this regard I make reference to the case of Douglas v Mayers .... " 
This extract is susceptible to attack on two grounds. Firstly the Court appears to 
be following a reactionary approach whereby the father's claim of custody is to 
be premised on proof that the mother is an unfit parent. This approach, it is 
respectfully submitted, is to be shunned, as the consideration of the best 
interests of the child in recent cases has not demanded such a high standard of 
201 Fraser v Children's Court 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) 
202 Wicks v Fisher 1999 (2) SA 504 {NPD) at p 507 
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proof from the father. The question should be asked whose care would be better 
for the child and not whether the mother is unfit as this would mean that only in 
exceptional circumstances would the father stand a chance. As this case was 
decided subsequent to the Natural Fathers Act, even though the act was not yet 
in force, it is submitted that the case was to be guided by the spirit of the 
legislation which marked a departure from such thinking. 
Secondly, It is respectfully submitted that this case erred in relying on the case of 
Douglas v Mayers, a case which has been severely criticised recently for 
imposing an unnecessarily strict and burdensome standard of proof upon the 
natural father. 204 
The Court later redeemed itself by stating that although the father in the 
Common Law does not have inherent rights in respect of his child that this did 
not mean that he had no rights at all.205 The Court eventually decided the matter 
by holding that it would be in the best interests of the child were custody to be 
resolved by a thorough consideration of all the facts and that such a 
consideration would only be possible if the mother and child remained in the 
country. The Court therefore granted the interdict. The Court recognised the 
change in current trends in respect of fathers' rights. Ultimately the Court was 
swayed by what it considered to be in the best interests of the child. 
164 ibid 
204 B v P op cit, B v S op cit 
205 Wicks v Fisher op cit at p 507 
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4. FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
4.1 England 
As has been shown above, our courts and academics have been guided to a 
large extent by developments in other jurisdictions and more particularly by the 
legal system of the United Kingdom. 206 In matters concerning children, that 
jurisdiction is particularly relevant as it has also been consistently declared in 
England that the best interests of the child are decisive in all disputes involving 
access, custody and guardianship. 
As is stated emphatically, if not tautologically, in the 1985 judgement Av C207 and 
quoted with approval in B v s,208 
" It [access] is a matter to be decided always entirely on the footing of the best interests of 
the child, either by agreement between the parties or by the Court if there is no agreement 
... The first and paramount consideration is the welfare of the child, bearing in mind, of 
course, the wishes and feelings and so on of the respective parents and other people 
concerned with the child, but always bearing in mind the that the decision must rest in 
terms of the best interests of the child" 
4.1.1 English Common Law 
Although in terms of the Common Law of South Africa the extra-marital child was 
held to have had only one parent, the mother, in terms of English Law the extra-
marital child had no legal relationship with either parent. The child was 
considered a fillius nullius,209or "nobody's child"210Hence, while there was great 
discrepancy between married and unmarried persons, unlike the traditional 
South African Common Law, at first there was little distinction between mothers 
206 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria op cit, B VS op cit, Van Erk v Holmer op cit, Clark and Van 
Heerden op cit 
207 Av C [1985] FLR 445 (CA) at 455E-H 
208 B v S op cit p 580 at par D 
209 Cretney and Masson Principles of Family Law p 602 
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and fathers. The fact that illegitimate children were legally "parentless" impacted 
negatively on their status and welfare as neither parent was responsible for the 
support of the child. 
4.1.2 English Legislation 
Legislative reform to the Common Law occurred in three phases. In 1971, the 
Guardianship of Minors Act was passed. In terms of this act the father could 
apply either for rights of access or custody to his child. That act was criticised for 
not allowing for situations where the unmarried couple had entered into an 
agreement relating to the parental rights and duties in respect of their children. 
Another shortfall of that act was that it oddly prohibited joint custody orders which 
does not seem to accord with the best interest principle as in particular cases, 
joint custody may be the most appropriate order. 
The English Law Commission, like its South African counterpart, conducted an 
investigation into the status of illegitimate children and the status of their 
relationship with their parents. In 1979 the Commission investigated the position 
of extra-marital children and recommended that the legal distinctions based on 
legitimacy be eradicated from the Law.211 The Commission went so far as to 
suggest that the relationship which these children enjoy with their parents was to 
be placed on an equal footing with that enjoyed by legitimate children. The 
upshot of this would have been that natural fathers would have been accorded 
the same automatic rights as married fathers. However this recommendation was 
rejected by lobbyists for one-parent families as it was argued on that the mother 
was still the parent who remained responsible for the child's care and as such 
would have been left vulnerable by such a provision.212 
210 Hogget Parents and Children p 32 
211 ibid 
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4.1.2.1 The Family Law Reform Act, 1987 
The various Law Commission investigations resulted in the enactment of The 
Family Law Reform Act (hereinafter the "1987 Act"). In this act it was 
conclusively established that the natural father was a "parent" for legal purposes 
and that he could apply for a "parental rights order'' in order to exercise parental 
authority in respect of his child. 
The 1987 act did not only lend definition to the class of people who might be 
termed 'parent'; it also regulated the factual question of paternity. Unlike the 
South African statute, the English 1987 act provides !that,'scientific tests' may be 
ordered in any proceedings in which paternity is disputed.213 It was further 
legislated that the refusal to submit to testing on the part of the father is 
corroborative evidence of paternity.214 It is submitted that the compelling of 
parties to submit to testing is perhaps unnecessary, especially as the legal 
presumptions and negative inferences that are drawn by the courts are capable 
of achieving the same effect. 
The 1987 act like its predecessor, the 1971 act, did not provide for parental 
agreements whereby the parties would agree on the issues of parental authority 
among themselves. The drafters omitted such a provision as it had been decided 
at that time that such an agreement would, 
212 ibid 
"erode the institution of marriage, by blurring the legal distinction between marriage and 
other relationships."215 
213 Bainham op cit p 217 
214 ibid 
215 Bainham op cit p 218 
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It is submitted respectfully that this is an unacceptable approach to have 
adopted, as it appears to be based, not on the best interests of the child but on a 
reactionary attitude on the part of the legislature to cohabitation and relationships 
which fall outside the bounds of matrimony. 
The provisions of the 1987 act were incorporated into the governing statute, 
which is still applicable today, The Children's Act 1989. The 1989 act did not 
differ greatly from the 1987 act except in the following respects. The latter statute 
spoke in terms of "parental responsibility" orders whereas the former provided for 
"parental rights "orders. This is a positive change as it shifts the emphasis from 
the rights of parents to the welfare of children by stressing the duties that parents 
have to their children and not the rights that they hold in respect of their children. 
The 1989 act introduced a change in terminology in that the accepted legal terms 
of 'custody' and 'access' were replaced by the terms of "residence' and 'contact'. 
The relevance of this change is unclear as the content of these terms has not 
been altered. The drafters may have wished to use terminology, which would be 
more accessible to the average layperson. 
4.1.2.2 The Children's Act 1989 
In terms of the act, the mother of an extra-marital child has automatic parental 
responsibility over the child.216However the natural father is only accorded the 
opportunity to apply for the granting of a parental responsibility order. This is not 
to say that he has no recognition. As Hogget stated, 
"This does not mean he has no relationship with the child. He is the child's "parent " 
whether or not he has parental responsibility, this means that he is liable to support the 
child; he may also be punished for neglect or ill-treatment; he is normally entitled to be 
consulted by the social services and to have contact with a child they are looking after 
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and he can always go to court for an order about the child's upbringing. The act also 
provides for several ways in which he may assume full responsibility , sharing it with the 
mother."217 
Hence English Law in a similar manner to South African Law is clear on the point 
that an unmarried father has a duty of support, however his entitlement to be 
involved in the upbringing of the child is less clear. 
The English Law Commission considered a suitable definition of the term, 
'parental responsibility'. It concluded that the statute should not list the 
components which make up the list as this was seen to be too restrictive. The 
Commission was concerned that the term be flexible enough to encompass the 
varying needs and circumstances of different children of different ages.218 Hence 
the English statute has chosen not to list the components of parental 
responsibility as is the case in the Scottish legislation.219 Instead Section 3 (1) of 
the Act provides, 
"In this Act parental responsibility means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and 
authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property."220 
Authors have elaborated on this definition and have suggested the following list 
of factors which should make up the term, "parental responsibility". These include 
the following rights; the right to physical possession over the child, the right to 
direct the child's upbringing, the power to control the child's education, the right 
to discipline the child, administer the child's property, to represent the child in 
legal proceedings, to choose the child's religion, to consent to the marriage and 
medical treatment of the child and the right to have contact with the child. The 
216 Hogget op cit p 32 
217 ibid 
218 Cretney &Masson op cit p 640 
219 ibid 
220 Section 3 (1) Children's Act 1989 
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duties have been listed as the duties to care for the child and maintain him or 
her.221 
What strikes one first about this list is that it seems to defeat the purpose of the 
term, "parental responsibility" as the authors list mainly rights whereas the duties 
are in the minority. It is therefore interesting to note that some legal 
commentators have not altered their perspectives on children's rights. 
The Scottish equivalent of the English Childrens Act, The Childrens Act 1995 
provides a comprehensive list of parental responsibilities. The act lists the 
following parental responsibilities; to safeguard and promote the child's health, to 
provide direction and guidance to the child, in a manner appropriate to the child's 
stage of development, where the child is not living with the parent, to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with the child on a regular basis and to act 
as the child's legal representative. 
The Act guarantees certain rights which are needed to fulfil these 
responsibilities. These include; the right to have the child live with the parent, to 
regulate the child's upbringing in a manner consistent with the child's stage of 
development and to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the child 
on a regular basis.222 
It is submitted that the Scottish approach is preferable to that of the English. It 
clearly lays out the responsibilities that rest in parents and only accords those 
rights needed to perform those duties. The Scottish Act therefore displays a 
commitment to children's rights. 
221 op cit p 612-623 
222 Sutherland " The unequal struggle- Fathers and Children in Scots Law Brixley v Lynas and Sanderson v 
McnMAnus" p 199 
4.1.2.2.1 Parental Responsibility Orders 
The English Children's Act 1989 states at Section 2, 
" Where a child's father and mother were not married to each other at the time 
of his birth-
(a) the mother shall have parental responsibility for the child; 
69 
(b) the father shall not have parental responsibility for the child, unless he acquires it in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act. " 
In terms of Section 4 of that act, an unmarried father may apply for parental 
responsibility, which would in appropriate circumstances apply alongside that of 
the mother.223 The effect of the granting of such an order is that the father has 
the same parental authority as a mother or married father. 
· Although the Scottish Law Commission recommended that natural fathers be 
awarded automatic parental responsibilities and rights, The effect of the Scottish 
Children's Act 1995 is very similar to its English counterpart. The natural father is 
provided with the opportunity to apply to Court for parental responsibility. 
The test that the English Court applies in the applications for a parental 
responsibility order have been laid down in the judgement of Re H224 and has 
been consistently followed, not only in subsequent English decisions, but also in 
223 Cretney and Masson p 638 
224 Re H [1991] 2 ALL ER 185 (CA) 
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the South African case of 8 v S.225The following passage of the English 
judgement appears in that decision, 226 
"The method adopted was not to equate the father of a child born out of wedlock with the 
father of a legitimate child: it was to give the putative (or natural) father the right to apply 
for an order giving all the parental rights and duties with respect to the child .. " 
Balcombe LJ went on to state that in an application for a parental responsibility 
order, the Court will consider, the degree of commitment which the father has 
shown towards the child, the degree of attachment which exists between them 
and the reasons the father has for applying for the order.227 This test was created 
in order to distinguish between those fathers who could have a positive impact 
on their children and those who might endanger their welfare. The test was used 
in the decision of 8 v S228 and later in the Fraser judgements.229 
It is submitted that the test is a pragmatic one and is aimed at protecting the best 
interests of the child. However as the South African statute, The Natural Father's 
Act has provided a more detailed and extensive list, it is submitted that that list is 
preferable. The factors mentioned in Re H230 are not as extensive as that of the 
acts. The English example provides even less certainty to the would-be applicant 
than does the South African example. 
4.1.2.2.2 Parental Responsibility by formal agreement 
The unwed father might also gain parental responsibility via the agreement of the 
mother. The agreement is to be written in the prescribed from and registered with 
the Court to have any force or effect. In these instances the Court plays an 
225 B v S op cit 
226 B v S op cit p 582 par J 
227 op cit p 640 
228 B v S op cit 
229 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria 1997 (2) SA 218 (T) 
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administrative role as it does not conduct an investigation into the child's welfare 
when it registers such an agreement. 
Although the Law Commission was hesitant to introduce this provision, it was 
welcomed by most legal commentators as a practical and cost effective manner 
in which the welfare of children is to be safeguarded. It is submitted that there 
should be a cursory investigation at least by the equivalent of the family 
advocates office as to the content of the agreement and whether it promotes the 
welfare of the child. 
The South African statute does not unfortunately provide for the attaining of 
rights via a formal agreement. The reason why this is unfortunate is that it would 
save the father the costs and alleviate him of the burden of bringing such an 
application to Court. This is not to say that the Court should not be involved at all 
but it is submitted that the agreement should be introduced into our law subject 
to certain safeguards. The Family Advocates office should be involved in 
checking that the child's interests are promoted by the agreement and the 
agreement should be capable of registration through a chamber book application 
which would be quick and low cost. 
4.1.2.2.3 Residence, Contact and other orders 
In terms of Section 8 of the Act, the father may apply for a contact order which is 
defined as, 
"an order requiring the person with whom the child lives ... to allow the child to visitor stay 
with the person named in the order or for the person and the child to have contact." 
230 Re H op cit 
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This order allows the unwed father a right to claim access to the child. It is 
therefore not necessary for their father to apply for parental responsibility in order 
to have access to the child. This appears to be a sensible ruling as, as stated 
above, access is the parental right, which is traditionally that of the father. South 
African Courts have been criticised for not differentiating between access 
applications and other parental claims. It is therefore logical that the father need 
not prove that he is entitled to parental responsibility in order to e,xercise access. 
Section 8 continues to state that a person might apply for a residence order. This 
is defined as, "an order settling the arrangements to be made as the person with 
whom a child is to live." A residence order granted in the father's favour 
automatically bestows upon him parental responsibility over the child. Hence a 
father wishing to assume control over the child might either apply in terms of 
section 4 for a parental responsibility order or a residence order in terms of 
section 8. A residence order is what we would understand to be a custody order 
and is defined as such for the purposes of the Hague Convention. 
4.1.2.2.4 Adoption 
Cretney and Masson write,231 
" Although the unmarried father does not have parental responsibility the law does not 
treat him as if he were a stranger to his child. He is now a parent within the meaning of 
any post 1987 statute. Thus, he does not require leave to seek an order giving him 
parental responsibility or any section 8 order ... However the father's consent is not 
required for the child's adoption or freeing for adoption and he need not be notified of the 
adoption proceedings unless he is maintaining the child. " 
Hence a natural father would not be involved in adoption proceedings unless he 
had acquired custody over the child or parental responsibility over the child or if 
231 Cretney and Mason op cit p 635 
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he was supporting the child. To an extent the adoption agency may still be 
required to contact a father who does not maintain the child however only in so 
far "as is reasonably practicable and in the interests of the child."232 
Although the Law Commission considered extending the list of fathers who 
would be involved to include those fathers who had access rights or contact 
orders, this suggestion was later rejected as being "too flimsy a basis on which to 
give the father rights which may not be in the best interests of the child."233 It is 
averred that this approach is incorrect .It is frankly absurd to regulate that a 
father who has regular contact with his child is not entitled to be notified and 
required to give his consent in the adoption proceedings of his child. 
Recently there has been pressure in England placed on Parliament to change 
the law relating to adoption.234 The Law Commission recommended in the 
Review of Adoption Law that natural fathers play a more important role. However 
little has changed and the adoption agencies have merely been encouraged to 
make greater efforts to contact the father.235 
4.1.2.3 Law of the United Kingdom as a Comparative Model 
It would appear that the jurisdictions of England and Scotland are faced with 
similar dilemmas to our own. It is interesting to note that all three systems adopt 
a similar approach. While Law Commission reports in all three countries have at 
some stage recommended the awarding of automatic rights to unwed fathers, 
legislation to that effect has never been passed. Legislators have all fallen short 
of effecting a drastic change to the law on the basis that an automatic award 
might endanger the welfare of the child and may place the single mother at risk. 
232 op cit p 917 
233 Bainham op cit p 225 
234 Cretney and Masson op cit p919 
235 Cretney and Masson op cit p 920 
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It is difficult to know whether these concerns outweigh the seeming injustice 
suffered by single fathers. However, little is said of the danger to the child- father 
relationship in not granting those rights. 
The English model is useful in that the award of parental responsibility through 
agreement is surely an option for South Africa. It is submitted that the adoption 
laws of South Africa are far more balanced to all parties and provide a better 
system than the English example. However the United Kingdom emphasis on 
parental responsibilities is to be emulated. 
The Scottish statute provides a useful model and South Africa could gain by 
adopting their stance on parental rights and responsibilities. Parental rights 
should only be granted inasmuch as they are needed in the discharging of 
parental responsibilities on all parents. 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is very difficult to assess whether the legal relationship between a natural 
father and his child has changed in a real sense since the Fraser judgement.236 
There has certainly been an increased awareness of the problems facing natural 
fathers and an attempt to introduce legislation to rectify any seeming injustices 
which they may have suffered. 
However, as has been shown above, despite the sympathy which the legislators 
and judiciary may have had to the natural father, the law has not changed to the 
extent that the natural father is accorded an inherent right to access, custody or 
guardianship of his child. On a practical level, the natural father is still faced with 
the onerous task of proving his claim before a High Court before he has a 
recognised claim to his child.237 The recent reforms, which have made his 
236 Fraser v Children's Court Pretoria North 1997 (2)SA 261 (CC) 
237 Natural Fathers Act op cit 
75 
consent a pre-requisite for a valid adoption have however made a real difference 
to the role of the natural father in adoption proceedings.238 
The reasoning advanced by the Courts and the legislators is that their primary 
responsibility is to the child and as such they are prevented from extending the 
ambit of the natural father's rights. It has been assumed by the Law 
Commission239 and the Court that the awarding of automatic rights to a natural 
father would pose a threat to the child.240 This assumption rests on the 
perception that the single mother is usually the parent charged with the 
responsibility of caring for the child and as such should not be burdened with the 
onus of repelling an undesirable natural father.241 
It is unfortunately not possible here to examine whether the assumption adopted 
by the drafters has a sound social basis and whether there is a need for 
Parliament to introduce greater protective mechanisms to protect a child from an 
unmarried father rather than a married father. However it should be noted that 
many foreign jurisdictions have adopted the same cautious approach to the 
awarding of parental rights to a natural father as is evident in the United Kingdom 
example.242 
It is submitted that there is merit to the approach adopted by Howie J in the 
8 v S decision. In that case he opines that if the emphasis is shifted from 
parental rights to children's rights, that there would be less concern regarding the 
rights to equality of unmarried fathers. He held in B v S at p 582, 
" If one is to speak of an inherent entitlement at all, it is that of the child, not the parent ... The 
importance of that conclusion lies not only in its identification of the person in whom any inherent 
238 Adoption Act op cit 
239 SALC Report 1994 op cit par 8 
240 B v S op cit , F v L op vit , Wicks v Fisher op cit , T v M op cit 
241 SALC Report 1994 op cit par 8, B v Sop cit, 
242 Bainham opcit 
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right truly vests, but also in its demonstration of the practical reality that the father of an illegitimate 
child is not unfairly discriminated against. " 
Not only would this approach eliminate any doubt regarding the unfair 
discrimination of unmarried fathers, but it would also be in accordance with the 
UN Convention of the Rights of the Child and Section 28 of the Constitution. 
However the shift can only be enforced by thoroughness on the part of the 
Courts whereby the true interests of the child are investigated through a 
searching assessment of the facts. Legal commentators and practitioners would 
also have to undergo a shift in thinking. As was evident in the English example, 
although the statute accorded parental responsibility, the authors persisted in 
listing mainly rights in a definition of that term.243 
However the Howie solution244 does not alter the fact that fathers who have been 
divorced are automatically awarded certain rights whereas unmarried fathers are 
not. By placing the burden of proof on the unmarried father to prove that his 
involvement is in his child's best interests, the legal system has made a value 
judgement regarding the relative worth of the two categories of father. 
This situation would be alleviated somewhat were we to follow the United 
Kingdom example and provide for formal agreements granting the father parental 
authority.245 In this way the Law still allows the mother a say regarding the 
father's involvement in the child's life yet neither party is forced to litigate. This 
agreement would presumably operate similarly to a consent paper incorporated 
in a decree of divorce and would place the single father on an equal footing to 
his married counterpart. Although the natural father would have to litigate if 
agreement could not be reached, the same result would occur in a divorce. 
243 Cretney and Masson p620 
244 B v S op cit 
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In an assessment of the reforms, it is important to bear in mind that the Law 
reformers were not necessarily seeking uniformity among all fathers but certainty 
in procedure and a more consistent jurisprudence. The Natural Father's Act has 
eliminated the confusion by laying down clear criteria for courts to follow. This 
would mean that the extreme approaches on either side described as the 
traditional approach and the inherent rights approach should no longer from part 
of our law. It must also be noted that he natural father has come a long way in 
being recognised since the early Common Law. He is no longer a "legal stranger 
to his child". 246 
Lawrie Fraser could not enjoy the fruits of his labour and has not been allowed to 
be involved in the upbringing of his child. Yet perhaps the greatest indicator of 
the change that has resulted from the Fraser judgements247 is, that were the 
Courts faced with the same set of facts today, only a few year after the event, the 
adoption would not have been approved without his consent. 
245 Hogget op cit p 45 
246 Docrat v Bahyat op cit 
247 Fraser v childrens Court Pretoria North 1997 ( 2) SA 261(CC) 
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